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Marriage as Black Citizenship?
R.A. Lenhardt*
The narrative of black marriage as citizenship enhancing has been pervasive in American
history. As we mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Moynihan Report and prepare to
celebrate the 150th anniversary of Thirteenth Amendment, this Article argues that this
narrative is one that we should resist. The complete story of marriage is one that involves
racial subordination and caste. Even as the Supreme Court stands to extend marriage
rights to LGBT couples, the Article maintains that we should embrace nonmarriage as a
legitimate frame for black loving relationships—gay or straight. Nonmarriage might do
just as much, if not more, to advance black civil rights.
Part I explores marriage’s role in racial subordination by looking at the experiences of
African Americans, as well as Native Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Asian Americans.
Drawing on institutional structure analyses, it then considers how legal marriage has
“married” Blacks to second-class citizenship. Part II explores the current place of
marriage in African America. It argues that, while the regulation of black loving
relationships today differs dramatically from what we saw in earlier times, family law
often has a punitive effect on such American families. Part III contemplates the benefits
of adopting a focus on nonmarriage. It contends that meeting black families where they
are holds the most potential for progress in addressing the structural barriers to success
faced by those families. The Article ends with a “call to action” for legal scholars and
others concerned about black families and citizenship. It maps a broad agenda for
exploring in earnest the potential that supporting and valuing the existing networks,
arrangements, and norms regarding gender and caretaking in African America has for
promoting black citizenship and equality in the twenty-first century.

* Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Brown University, A.B.; Harvard Law School, J.D.;
Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, M.P.A.; former Law Clerk to Justice Stephen
G. Breyer. This Article is dedicated to the two Marys. I wish to thank Michelle Adams, Rick Banks, Elise
Boddie, Devon Carbado, Bill Crawley, Eleanor Brown, Sheila Foster, Katherine Franke, Rachel Godsil,
Michelle Goodwin, Jennifer Gordon, Olati Johnson, Clare Huntington, Sonia Katyal, Holning Lau, Serena
Mayeri, Mellissa Murray, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Kimani Paul-Emile, Russell Robinson, and the
participants of the Emerging Family Law Scholars Workshop for very helpful comments and discussions
in connection with this Article. I am grateful to Fordham Law School, Juan Fernandez, Will Fullwood,
Kwame Akosah, Molly Ryan, Peter Torre, and Sara Jaramillo for critical research support.
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Introduction: Marriage as Black Citizenship?
In 1866, a U.S. Colored Troops corporal delivered a public address
heralding the state of Virginia’s decision to legalize black unions in the
1
wake of the Civil War. Previously, black slaves in that state and others
throughout the country were deemed to lack the legal capacity to formalize
2
their affective relationships. For this soldier and so many others in the
fledgling community of emancipated persons, the extension of marriage
rights signified the previously unimaginable potential for former slaves to
secure full American citizenship rights. “‘[T]he [m]arriage [c]ovenant,”
he explained to those gathered, “‘is at the foundation of all our rights. In
slavery we could not have legalized marriage: now we have it . . . and we
3
shall be established as a people.’”
As the nation prepares to mark the 150th anniversary of the
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment later this year, the narrative of
black marriage as citizenship enhancing is one that retains tremendous
amount of force. Inside and outside of African America, the widely held
belief is, first, that marriage uniformly helped to elevate Blacks from a
deeply degraded status and, second—insofar as the position of African
Americans remains one still marked by disparities in areas ranging from
employment to criminal justice to family life—that it can do so again.
Indeed, marriage’s popularity as a public policy response to black
inequality has not ebbed since emancipation.
Significantly, this year also marks the fiftieth anniversary of the
release of the so-called Moynihan Report, the exegesis on black family
1. Laura F. Edwards, Gendered Strife & Confusion: The Political Culture of Reconstruction
46 (1997).
2. Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 Stan. L.
Rev. 221, 229 (1999).
3. Edwards, supra note 1, at 47.
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disadvantage and citizenship penned by former Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan when he was an assistant secretary at the Department of
4
Labor. The language of black “pathology” and “matriarchal pattern”
that the report deployed in diagnosing nonmarriage as a core challenge
5
for 1960s African America still evokes strong criticism. But the legitimacy
of the “national call” to focus on black “family structure” and marriage
as the way of eradicating social and economic barriers to black belonging
6
that it issued has not been seriously challenged. If anything, it has been
amplified many times over, as the inclusion of marriage promotion
provisions in national policy initiatives and federal statutes such as the
7
1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act attests.
This Article argues that the stock narrative that attends black
marriage in this country is one that legal scholars and others concerned
about African American citizenship and families should interrogate more
deeply, if not resist. As an initial matter, this narrative obscures essential
realities about African America’s actual experience with marriage over
time. The real story of African American marriage is far more complex
than it allows. Research in this area suggests that the Reconstruction
period did not feature happy black brides and grooms so much as fragile
black unions too often forged through trickery, government coercion,
8
and punishment. Second, an expansive view of African America’s
history with marriage makes it plain that legal marriage has not fulfilled
the promise of full belonging and acceptance for Blacks. Indeed, if
anything, marriage has very often been synonymous with racial caste in
9
the United States—for African Americans and other minority groups. In
ways that have largely gone unnoticed, marriage regulation—not unlike
Jim Crow segregation in public schools or housing—has been instrumental
in locking African America into a second-class citizenship from which it
has not yet fully emerged.
Even more, the disproportionate focus on marriage has placed an
unfortunate upper bound on our thinking and imagination with respect

4. See Office of Policy Planning & Research, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Negro Family: The
Case for National Action (1965).
5. Id. at 31, 47–48.
6. Id. at 47–48.
7. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-93,
110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–603); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The
Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure As the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 Calif. L.
Rev. 1647, 1649 (2005) (discussing statute).
8. Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American
Marriages, 11 Yale J.L. & Human. 251, 308 (1999).
9. See, e.g., Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation 24–30, 32–34,
42–46 (2000) (discussing, inter alia, treatment of Native Americans and Blacks under eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century marriage laws).
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to matters of race and citizenship. In recent years, family law scholars
and others have explored a number of alternative frames for structuring
10
and supporting families. Yet, the potential such options hold for
promoting black equality and citizenship has too often not been a topic
of discussion. What we need is a change in focus, a reset, if you will. In
the pages that follow, I issue a new call to action, but one that differs
dramatically from the one that the Moynihan Report voiced fifty years
ago. Instead of holding traditional marriage out as the presumptive
lodestar in this domain, scholars, policy makers, and community leaders
need seriously to consider a range of possible frames for affective black
relationships, including nonmarriage. This does not mean abolishing
marriage as an institution; it simply means reconsidering its supremacy as
the presumptive vehicle for supporting black relationships.
The time to engage in such an inquiry could not be more opportune.
The Supreme Court is poised to render a decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,
a case raising the constitutionality of state bans on the extension of marriage
11
rights to same-sex couples. While the legal issues that it raises bear most
directly on LGBT Americans, its outcome and effects will not be so limited.
Questions about the relationship between marriage and citizenship have
implications for all Americans, but especially for African Americans—
whether gay or straight.
Today, multiple generations after Emancipation, African America is
12
the most unmarried of any group in the country. While the unmarried
family configurations of Whites have become a matter of interest, even
fascination, those of Blacks, which are disproportionately poor and headed
by females, continue to be both stigmatized and marginalized within the
13
broader community. Even now, the struggles that nonmarital black
families face are cast primarily as the result of unwise individual choices
rather than as a function of the same structural inequalities that limit
black opportunity in areas such as public education, housing, employment,
and criminal justice. What I argue in the pages that follow, however, is
that matters of black marriage and family should also be seen as matters

10. See, e.g., Laura Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 189, 194–97, 208–12 (2007)
(arguing for government recognition of friendship).
11. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom., Obergefell v. Hodges, 83
U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-556).
12. See Pew Research Ctr., The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families 10 (2010),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf [hereinafter Decline of
Marriage]; see also Rachel F. Moran, Loving and the Legacy of Unintended Consequences, 2007 Wis. L.
Rev. 239, 274–76 (discussing, inter alia, changes in marriage and social norms in this area). The percentage
of married Americans fell from seventy-two percent in 1960 to fifty-two percent in 2008. Decline of
Marriage, supra, at 1.
13. See, e.g., Abby Ellin, Making a Child, Minus the Couple, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2013, at ST.1.
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of civil rights. They are intimately intertwined with questions of black
citizenship and belonging in the twenty-first century.
This Article maps a broad agenda for interrogating and better
understanding the relationship between black citizenship and family. In
doing so, it makes a number of important contributions. First, it identifies
marriage as an institution that has functioned to structure race as well as
14
family. I argue that marriage has often served to foster racial
subordination and then engage in an exploration of its role limiting
intimate choice and freedom for African Americans, but also other
minority groups. Second, building on my prior work advocating the use
of race audits to identify the sources of racial inequality and their effects,
I demonstrate that deploying institutional structure analyses can help to
reveal the ways in which marriage regulation—historically, as well as
with respect to current policy—has contributed to cumulative racial
15
disadvantage for African Americans in particular.
Third, in light of historical and current statistics on black affective
relationships, the Article observes that marriage, notwithstanding the
dominant narrative, is unlikely to provide a vehicle for securing full
belonging for African Americans. I argue that, instead of obsessing over
the ever-expanding array of marriage promotion programs that have
surfaced over time, what we need is to embrace and support black
loving—in intimate, as well as in parental or other caregiving
relationships—as it is currently experienced, without being preoccupied
16
with how well it fares against the marriage yardstick. Accordingly, this
Article briefly explores options for black relationships and families that
might have greater capacity for fostering black belonging and could lead
to benefit allocations for nonmarital families that approach those we now
see in the marriage arena. The extension of such benefits could have a
17
tremendous impact on black inequality overall. Although it is not this
Articles’ project, it might even serve to promote black marriage, to the
extent that unmarried African Americans frequently rank marriage high
in importance but cite inadequate resources as a reason for not
formalizing intimate relationships.
Finally, as indicated previously, I make the case that matters of
marriage in the twenty-first century ultimately go to questions of black
14. See R.A. Lenhardt, Structuring Families, Structuring Race, Balkinization (Oct. 30, 2014, 10:38 PM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/10/structuring-families-structuring-race.html (arguing that family structures
race as well as families).
15. R.A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 Hastings L.J. 1527 (2011).
16. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 7, at 1653, 1673–82 (discussing marriage promotion targeting
Blacks). See generally Melanie Heath, One Marriage Under God: The Campaign to Promote Marriage
in America (2012) (exploring how marriage promotion in Oklahoma defined cultural repertoires of the
middle-class, married, heterosexual family as the model of American citizenship).
17. For a discussion on black inequality, see generally Lenhardt, supra note 15.
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civil rights. This framing of the issue is one that I urge law and policy
makers to adopt. Just as importantly, I contend that African America
itself must begin to see the place of marriage as a civil rights issue on par
with housing discrimination or school segregation. While nonmarital
black families have long been the subject of public discourse, civil rights
organizations have frequently excluded matters of family formation and
support from their core agenda, treating them as essentially private
18
matters. This Article argues that this must also change to facilitate a
more nuanced understanding of the relationships between race, family,
and belonging in this country.
Part I begins the Article by examining marriage’s underexplored
role in effecting racial subordination. It argues that the true story of legal
marriage in this country involves racial caste and subordination. Part I.A
first complicates the typical narrative of early black marriage and then
looks to provide insight into the racialized effects of marriage regulation
on other groups. It considers the ways in which marriage promotion for
groups such as Native Americans and Puerto Ricans has, as a historical
matter, frequently been premised on the inherent inferiority of such
groups and the need to civilize or acculturate them to dominant white
approaches to intimacy and family, even if by force or coercion. It also
considers the denial and “disestablishment” of citizenship by marriagerelated immigration laws that marked Asian Americans as too “foreign”
19
for inclusion in the polity.
Part I.B shifts to focus more directly on the African American
experience and argues that, rather than a vehicle for black liberation,
marriage has been instrumental in effecting racial discrimination and
disadvantage that has, over the years, married African America to
second-class citizenship. To understand the multiple ways in which this
has been true, the Article advocates the use of institutional structure
analyses. Such analyses have been deployed very effectively to unpack
how New Deal programs such as the G.I. Bill and Social Security, as well
as welfare initiatives, retrenched black disadvantage and racial inequality.
The Subpart makes the case that using an institutional or structural lens
for research in this area could greatly enhance our understanding of
marriage’s true race effects where African America is concerned. Among
other things, it would deepen our understanding of the structural
implications of antimiscegenation law and other laws and policies
concerning that institution.

18. Melinda Chateauvert, Framing Sexual Citizenship: Reconsidering the Discourse on African
American Families, 93 J. Afr. Am. Hist. 198, 201 (2008).
19. See Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizenship
Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 405 (2005).

Lenhardt_23 (LRH)

June 2015]

6/22/2015 9:46 PM

MARRIAGE AS BLACK CITIZENSHIP?

1323

Part II starts a conversation about how to think about black marriage
and citizenship today, when entrance into marriage is increasingly on the
wane in the United States, but experiencing its steepest decline in
20
African America. Part II.A begins by setting out the basic statistics on
black marriage decline. Part II.B then considers the main focus of the
Moynihan Report—the case of so-called “fragile” black families—poor,
typically female-headed, unmarried caregiving units. It first offers
demographic information and the results of sociological research by
Katheryn Edin and others to provide a more comprehensive picture of
such families and why the women and men who create them may not see
21
marriage as a viable option for family formation. The Subpart then
considers the barriers not just to marriage, but also to successful family
outcomes that fragile black families face. It initially considers the
challenges that structural obstacles such as unemployment, incarceration,
and housing insecurity present for such caregiving units, but then turns to
focus on family law-related structures and systems as well. Drawing on
recent scholarship by Clare Huntington and others, the Subpart argues
that the structures and systems of family law itself—that is, “structural
family law”—must also be considered when evaluating the status of these
22
families. Agreeing with legal scholars who lament that modern family
law is more often punitive than supportive, the Subpart asserts that
structural family law is often hardest on fragile, unmarried families of
color who do not comply with traditional nuclear family norms. Indeed,
it intervenes in their lives in ways that disrupts important familial
relationships, compromises family autonomy, and exacerbates the effects
23
of racial disadvantage and stigma in this context. In other words, while
the hyper regulation and abuses detailed in Part I are remnants of the
past, family law policies today still work to disadvantage families of
color.
Part III considers what African America’s response should be to this
reality in a world where, even if marriage does not secure full belonging
20. See Decline of Marriage, supra note 12, at 1; Ralph Richard Banks, Is Marriage for
White People: How the African American Marriage Decline Affects Everyone 7 (2011); Pew
Research Ctr., Women, Men and the New Economics of Marriage, 22 (2010), http://pewsocialtrends.org/
files/2010/10/new-economics-of-marriage.pdf. For more on black marriage decline and its effects, see
The Decline in Marriage Among African Americans: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Implications
(M. Belinda Tucker & Claudia Mitchell-Kernan eds., 1995).
21. See Kathryn Edin & Maria Kefalas, Promises I Can Keep: Why Poor Women Put Motherhood
Before Marriage 216 (2005). See generally Kathryn Edin & Timothy J. Nelson, Doing the Best I
Can: Fatherhood in the Inner City (2013) (examining “a culture-wide shift in the meaning of fatherhood
that has accompanied changes in the meaning of marriage”).
22. See Clare Huntington, Failure to Flourish: How Law Undermines Family Relationships xii
(2014).
23. See id.; see also Maxine Eichner, The Supportive State: Families, Government, and America’s
Political Ideals (2010).
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for all, it still functions as the metric against which all intimate
24
relationships—married or unmarried—are assessed and valued. Given
past history and current statistics on “fragile” black loving relationships,
it confronts a reality that few people—inside African America and out—
have been willing to internalize: traditional marriage is unlikely to secure
black belonging any time soon. The Part thus argues that legal scholars
and others should begin to think more about nonmarriage and the
possibilities that exist for supporting nonmarital relationships in African
America. Nonmarriage and nonmarital parenting are on the rise in the
25
United States. In some communities, these options for configuring
intimate relationships and family have become increasingly accepted as
26
legitimate, viable alternatives; but for African America, they remain a
mark of pathology and familial dysfunction. This needs to change.
Instead of asking why African Americans are not doing better with
marriage, we should consider not just why marriage is not working for
African Americans, but also how destigmatizing and honoring existing
black loving and familial relationships can promote black citizenship and
belonging. The Part argues that one way to move the needle is to begin
to devise better mechanisms for supporting nonmarital black relationships
as they currently exist. Existing family law systems offer such support to
27
predominantly white marital families in a variety of ways. The time has
come to do the same for black nonmarital families as well.
Part IV ends the Article by elaborating further on the content of the
call to action that it issues. It notes that while supporting nonmarital families
where they are is a critical first step, legal scholars and others concerned
about black citizenship must ultimately begin to engage seriously with a
much broader set of issues relating to race, black families, and belonging.

I. Marriage as Racial Subordination
Marriage has long functioned as a primary mechanism for racial
formation in the United States, an essential pillar in the construction of
racial norms and hierarchies. Yet, scholars of race and family law have been
slow fully to engage it as such. So often, attention focuses on the myriad
ways in which marriage structures families, delineating, among other things,

24. See Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction
of the Family and the State, 112 Yale L.J. 1641, 1654 (2003) (noting, in the context of a discussion about
women, the extent to which “lawmakers still look to marriage as a public policy tool,” even though rights
for those in nonmarital relationships formally exist).
25. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Ellin, supra note 13.
27. See Huntington, supra note 22, at 58.
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spousal roles and obligations, especially with respect to children. Laws
and policies pertaining to marriage, however, also work to structure
race—racial categories and meaning, as well as the experience of race—
29
in ways that we overlook to our detriment. This Part thus turns to
consider the relationship between race, marriage, and citizenship in this
country and its implications, especially where African America is
concerned. It makes the claim that for African Americans, but also other
groups, this celebrated institution has sadly very often been citizenship
diminishing. The true story of marriage in the United States is one of
racial caste and subordination that sits alongside efforts to secure family
and freedom.
Part II.A looks broadly at the racialized effects of marriage
regulation efforts over time. It begins by correcting certain misconceptions
about the history of black marriage, emphasizing the institution’s regulatory
effects where the policing of racial categories and black families are
concerned. The Subpart then turns to consider the experiences of Native
Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Asian Americans in particular. It
demonstrates that while the history of black marriage is, of course,
distinct from that of other groups, it is not exactly unique. Marriage has
been dispatched to control, stigmatize, and subordinate other racial
groups in ways that parallel African Americans’ experience with that
institution. Part II.B looks at the particular story of African America
with a lens trained on the long-term effects of freedpersons’ entrance
into marriage, consequences obscured by the narrative of marriage as
citizenship. Incorporating institutional analyses that have been utilized to
identify the sources of cumulative racial inequalities in other contexts,
this Subpart demonstrates that, for African America, marriage’s role in
racial subordination has adapted over time.30 It has played a primary role
in carving out a separate and unequal tier of citizenship in which, in
many respects, it still resides.
A. Marriage as Caste
The narrative of black marriage as primarily citizenship enhancing
derives much of its purchase from perceptions of Emancipation and
historical research suggesting that “after the [Civil] [W]ar multitudes [of

28. For insight into this function of marriage and other family law structures, see, for example,
Huntington, supra note 22.
29. See Lenhardt, supra note 14.
30. Elise C. Bodie, Adaptive Discrimination (Mar. 26, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (discussing adaptive nature of discrimination generally).
Brief of Amicus Curiae Marriage Equality USA in Support of Respondents at 15–16, Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010) (No. 12-144). For other examples, see id. at 32.
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former slaves] rushed to marry, often in mass ceremonies.” While the
picture it paints is undeniably compelling, the black marriage as
citizenship narrative rests on a flawed account of history. In addition to
relying on a historical snapshot that ignores much of African America’s
actual experience with marriage, the narrative gets the story of
freedpersons’ entrance into legal marriage from which it derives most of
its force wrong. At bottom, the narrative regards states and Reconstruction
government officials as fundamentally benevolent in their extension of
marital rights; it conceives of former slaves ravaged by the “peculiar
institution” as effectively made whole by their entrance into matrimony.
Yet, important research concerning the postbellum era tells a different
story.
The work of historians and legal scholars confirms the intimate
relationship between marriage and citizenship in post-Civil War
32
America. But it does not support the proposition, implicit in the
narrative, that marriage was the only frame for black loving during this
period or the notion that its extension to freedpersons eased their
transition into citizenship. Indeed, too often just the opposite was true.
For many freedpersons, marriage was desirable because it held the
33
promise of “reclaim[ing] families torn asunder by slavery and war” ;
34
establishing private lives free from “white interference” ; and securing

31. Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market
in the Age of Slave Emancipation 44 (1998). Some looked to formalize marriages that had existed during
slavery, but others sought to marry for the first time. See Noralee Frankel, Freedom’s Women: Black
Women and Families in Civil War Era Mississippi 81 (1999) (accusing “[h]istorians [of] exaggerat[ing] the
number of slave couples who remarried each other after the war”). Not insignificantly, narratives
emphasizing marriage’s citizenship enhancing capacity have frequently been deployed in the movement to
secure equal marriage rights for LGBT couples. For example, an amicus brief compiling citizenship
testimonials from LGBT couples submitted in support of the respondents in Hollingsworth v. Perry
helps to make the point. It included the following passage on the experience that one gay couple had after
securing marriage rights in New York State:
Before New York ended the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, John Mace and
his spouse, Richard Dorr, very much felt the stigma of not being able to marry. As John put
it, “It’s terrible to be looked down upon and be considered a second-class citizen.” “We
have friends who say, ‘I’ve always considered you guys married,’ but the reality is, we don’t
have official status here,” he said. “When I fill out a form, I have to identify myself as single,
when in reality, it’s spouse and spouse.” But after John and Richard were able to marry in
New York in 2012, John exclaimed, “We are no longer second-class citizens.”
Brief of Amicus Curiae Marriage Equality USA in Support of Respondents at 15–16, Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010) (No. 12-144). For other examples, see id. at 32.
32. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 46; Franke, supra note 8, at 307; Mary Farmer-Kaiser,
Freedwomen and the Freedmen’s Bureau: Race, Gender, & Public Policy in the Age of Emancipation
155 (2010); Frankel, supra note 31, at 80–84.
33. Farmer-Kaiser, supra note 32, at 97.
34. Id.
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protection from the sexual exploitation of black women. Many others,
however, were quite ambivalent about formalizing their intimate
36
relationships. As Noralee Frankel explains in her book exploring the
lives of freedwomen, there were “African Americans [who] did not see
37
the need for legalized marriage” at all.
Postbellum marriage initiatives functioned less to honor black
loving relationships than to reestablish control over former slaves and
38
their “domestic relations.” Indeed, with slavery eliminated, marriage
became a critical path to erecting something approximating the masterservant relationship that had previously existed—its power configuration
39
as well as its color distinctions. Under nineteenth-century norms,
marriage and the male governance of households it facilitated was necessary
to combat a potentially lethal threat “to civil order [and effective
40
government] more generally.” Whites thus viewed legal marriage as
essential to the economic, social, and moral reconstruction of the South,
41
as well as the Union as a whole. Nonmarriage, in their estimation, posed
a threat to the project of creating black households, as a way both to
internalize the tremendous dependency of former slaves within black
families, and to ensure adherence to prevailing gender norms and rules
42
for sexual behavior.
Reconstruction-era officials at all levels devoted substantial
resources to the project of creating black husbands and wives, and
43
policed the boundaries of marriage with vigor. Southern states moved
44
quickly to enact laws establishing black marriage. Mississippi, for
example, in 1865, passed a law providing that “[a]ll freedmen, free
negroes and mulattoes, who do now and have heretofore lived and

35. Shirley A. Hill, Black Intimacies: A Gender Perspective on Families and Relationships
77 (2005).
36. See Stanley, supra note 31, at 44–45 (explaining, inter alia, that many former slaves did not want
to assume the obligations of marriage).
37. See Frankel, supra note 31, at 91. To this group, the diverse array of intimate arrangements
developed during slavery had more appeal. Alternatives such as “sweethearting,” “taking up,” and “living
together” established a differentiated spectrum of commitment not possible with legal marriage and posed
fewer obstacles to exit. Id.
38. Edwards, supra note 1, at 45.
39. Frankel, supra note 31, at 26; Edwards, supra note 1, at 93; see Franke, supra note 8, at 294
(explaining that during this period “marriage was positioned as an institution that would ‘save the race
from moral ruin’”).
40. Catherine J. Denial, Making Marriage: Husbands, Wives and the American State in
Dakota and Ojibwe Country 12 (2013).
41. Frankel, supra note 31, at 26; Edwards, supra note 1, at 93; see Franke, supra note 8, at 294
(explaining that during this period “marriage was positioned as an institution that would ‘save the race
from moral ruin’”).
42. Franke, supra note 8, at 302.
43. See id. at 296.
44. Id. at 297.
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cohabited together as husband and wife shall be taken and held in law as
45
legally married,” automatically, ensuring that there would be freedpersons
who would be completely unaware of their newly imposed marital status.
Similarly, officials on the ground deployed a range of techniques to
buttress the foundation that nineteenth century marriage was understood
46
to provide. Some Freedman’s Bureau officials even went so far as to
deploy physical force, boasting of their willingness to have “a Bayonet at
. . . former slaves’ backs all the time” and, if necessary, to adopt even
47
more drastic measures to ensure compliance with marriage laws. Even
courts found themselves drawn into the project of stamping out non48
traditional black loving relationships. In effect, the goal during this
period was not to establish unfettered black citizenship as the stock black
marriage narrative implies. Instead, the objective was to create, through
often brutal and unforgiving state regulation, the “right” kind of black
citizens, productive, sexually compliant, gender conforming, and, of
49
course, married.
Time and circumstance separate the experience of newly
emancipated persons with marriage from those of other groups. Still, as
suggested earlier, meaningful parallels exist. For example, just as in the
Reconstruction era, Whites in the Native American context and that of
colonial Puerto Rico reacted with some concern upon encountering
family structures, sexual practices, and gender roles that did not comport
with traditional white norms. To English colonists and, later, early
American missionaries, traders, and government agents, the communal
kinship systems, fluid gender norms, and polygamous and other intimate
50
practices of Native peoples “flew in the face of colonial morality.”
These differences, especially those that permitted women to exercise
control over agricultural endeavors, instead of limiting their affairs to the
51
home front as experienced by white women, marked the already racially
52
divergent Native American peoples as “barbarous and savage.”
Likewise, in Puerto Rico, the American colonial government found
“the high incidence of consensual unions, serial sexual relationships, and
female-headed households among the popular classes” exceedingly

45. Civil Rights Act of 1865, ch. 4, § 3, 1865 Miss. Laws. 82.
46. See Franke, supra note 8, at 293.
47. See Stanley, supra note 31, at 45–46 (describing incident of Freedmen’s Bureau agent who
trapped freedman reluctant to marry in a dark hole at gunpoint until he agreed to do so).
48. See Franke, supra note 8, at 296.
49. See Amy L. Brandzel, Queering Citizenship?: Same-Sex Marriage and the State, 11 GLQ: J.
Gay & Lesbian Stud. 171, 196 (2005).
50. Heath, supra note 16, at 152.
51. Cott, supra note 9, at 25.
52. Id. at 154.
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53

concerning. These behaviors—combined with high rates of interracial
intimacy that served to blur racial boundaries in ways that sounded
alarms for “North Americans steeped in the United States’ rigidly
54
bipolar racial system”—became a primary focus. Officials worried
openly about what nonconformity along lines of race and sexuality meant
for Puerto Rico, an island that figured prominently in plans for American
55
expansionism. As one scholar noted, the U.S. Attorney General himself
voiced fears in a speech about possible contagion, asking whether,
without adequate interventions, “‘we [Americans] are to be infected and
56
contaminated by the immoralities of Porto Rico [sic].’”
Civilizing the respective groups of indigenous peoples and rooting
out difference became a high priority for eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury government officials in the western plains of the continental
United States and in the tropics. In the case of Native Americans, the
focus was on the introduction of property ownership, animal domestication,
57
and other similar measures, but especially legal marriage. Intermarriage
emerged as a key strategy for missionaries, traders eager to advance
58
commerce, and government officials keen on westward expansion. This
“whitening” strategy produced a new racial hierarchy within Native
communities that white settlers and officials later exploited, but not the
59
cultural changes sought. Accordingly, as time progressed and the
national goals shifted from assimilating to dominating Native tribes,
other marriage-related mechanisms for corralling errant behaviors and
60
gender practices took on more prominence. For example, in the late
1800s in particular, special Indian courts became a place where
61
allegations of sexual promiscuity or polygamy could be punished, either
62
“with fines, deprivation of rations, or hard labor.”
53. Eileen J. Suarez Findlay, Imposing Decency: The Politics of Sexuality and Race in Puerto
Rico, 1870–1920, at 120; see 33 Cong. Rec. app. 175, 177 (1900) (remarks of Sen. Ebenezer J. Hill)
(“‘They sin, but they sin only as animals, without shame, because there is no sense of doing wrong.
They eat the forbidden fruit, but it brings with it no knowledge of the difference between good and
evil . . . . They are innocently happy in the unconsciousness of the obligations of morality.”).
54. Findlay, supra note 53, at 119.
55. Id. at 113–15.
56. Eileen Findlay, Love in the Tropics, in Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural
History of U.S.-Latin American Relations 139, 150 (Gilbert M. Joseph et al. eds., 1998).
57. See Denial, supra note 40, at 15.
58. See Theda Perdue, “Mixed Blood” Indians: Racial Construction in the Early South 52
(2005). For a discussion of “custom marriages” between white traders and Native women and their
importance to trade, see Denial, supra note 40, at 35; Nancy Goodman & Robert Goodman, Joseph R.
Brown: Adventurer (1996).
59. Perdue, supra note 58, at 52–53, 74.
60. Id. at 76.
61. Heath, supra note 16, at 15.
62. Cott, supra note 9, at 123. Significantly, so-called Indian courts had been in existence since
the 1600s. See Ann Marie Plane, Colonial Intimacies: Indian Marriage in Early New England (2000).
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Similarly, over time legal measures designed to advance Indian
removal efforts, whether forcible or by agreement, began to increasingly
incorporate provisions consonant with white paternalism and monogamous
63
marriage. Such incorporation served to make express “the link between
‘civilization’” and conformity with prevailing norms pertaining to gender
64
and marriage. An 1817 treaty with the Cherokee that invoked common
law coverture helps to illustrate the point. The treaty, which gave 640
acres of land to “each and every head of any Indian family” wishing to
“become citizens of the United States,” included a provision for dower, a
testamentary override that required a husband upon death, even against
65
his wishes, to provide financial support to his widow. In effect, “[d]ower,
like [the] coverture [system as a whole], sought to ensure a woman’s
66
economic reliance on a particular man.” It functioned primarily to avoid
the possibility that poor women might become reliant on the public fisc
67
after the death of their husbands. As Catherine Denial notes in a recent
book on legal marriage in former Dakota and Ojibwe country, the
inclusion of the dower provision, which rested on ideas about women’s
inherent dependency and incapacity, reflected prevailing white norms,
68
not Native “value[s].” It exemplified the “U.S. government’s commitment
to reorganizing American Indian gender roles, marital responsibilities,
and concepts of property ownership” through and in support of its
69
management of Indian affairs and removal.

But they rarely dealt with matters of intimacy at that time. See Daniel K. Richter, Love Colonial Style,
29 Am. Hist. 491, 493 (2001) (reviewing Plane, supra).
63. Denial, supra note 40, at 27.
64. Id. at 15. Coverture, a common law doctrine governing spousal relations, essentially “‘covered’ a
married woman’s legal identity with her husband’s identity . . . .” Dubler, supra note 24, at 1645. It literally
stripped married women of any legal identity independent from that of their husbands’. See Mary L.
Heen, From Coverture to Contract: Engendering Insurance on Lives, 23 Yale J.L. & Feminism 335, 348
(2011) (discussing coverture system); see also Farmer-Kaiser, supra note 32, at 31; Franke, supra note 8,
at 258. For a discussion of that doctrine and impact of women’s citizenship, see generally Candice Lewis
Bredbenner, A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship (1998); Cott,
supra note 9; Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of
Citizenship (1998); Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 1830–1934,
103 Am. Hist. Rev. 1440 (1998).
65. Denial, supra note 40, at 15; see Dubler, supra note 24, at 1652–53. The 1887 Dawes Severalty
Act, which divided Indian territory into plots to be accorded to tribal “household” heads desirous of
citizenship, provides another noteworthy example. See Cott, supra note 9, at 123. This provision did
not reference gender or even marriage per se. See id. But, in establishing a system of property ownership
incommensurate with communal living, it “further subverted women’s roles as agriculturalists by presuming
the Indian male should be the landowner and farmer.” Id.
66. Dubler, supra note 24, at 1652–53.
67. Id.
68. Denial, supra note 40, at 16.
69. Id.
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For the colonial government in Puerto Rico, the objective was not
70
the creation of legal marriage, but rather its “massification.” American
officials, who regarded much of the island’s populace as “without
ambition” or lacking in “incentive to labor beyond the least that will
71
provide the barest sustenance,” believed that “[a] productive, properly
disciplined workforce and stable political order could only be built on a
72
base of marriage and ‘legitimate’ families.” They thus sought to expand
access to marriage by initiating civil code reforms designed to enhance its
73
appeal to locals. An 1899 decree legalized civil marriage and prohibited
74
municipal court fees for wedding ceremonies. Later enactments further
extended civil reforms, such as one granting solemnization rights to “all
75
ministers, rabbis, and judges on the island.” Finally, when these measures
affected no substantial increase in marriage rates, the government
paradoxically instituted divorce reforms, reasoning that enhanced ability
to exit unhappy marital unions and to enforce the obligations of marriage
76
would make the institution more attractive.
These two examples, like the example of African America’s
entrance into legal marriage, underscore the extent to which “‘race,
sexuality, [and] gender . . . have been mutually conditioning in the
77
production of American whiteness’” and structural systems. In each,
government officials’ assessment of the need for legal marriage was
premised on the assumed racial and moral inferiority of the relevant
groups. Indeed, their certainty on this score made it possible to justify
military action and the destruction of cultural practices, kinship systems,
78
and gender norms with deep roots in both societies. Insofar as marriage
in both the Native American and Puerto Rican contexts required the
creation of new or supplemental legal systems focused on disciplining or
homogenizing racial, gender, and sexual difference, we can understand
that institution as not just a reflection of civil order, as early Americans
maintained, but also as a key instrument in reinforcing an expansive,
79
racialized project of Americanization.
Perhaps no example highlights this particular point as starkly as that
of Asian Americans, whose treatment over time has so often involved

70. Findlay, supra note 56, at 150.
71. 33 Cong. Rec. app. 175, 177 (1900) (remarks of Sen. Ebenezer J. Hill).
72. Findlay, supra note 53, at 120.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 113.
75. Id. at 121.
76. Id.
77. R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight for
Same-Sex Marriage, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 839, 854–66 (2008).
78. See Denial, supra note 40, at 16.
79. Findlay, supra note 53, at 1–17.
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questions of immigration and national citizenship. From the late
nineteenth century to well into the twentieth, Congress implemented a
program under immigration law designed not just to exclude Asians from
U.S. borders, but also to indelibly mark them as racially and morally
80
undesirable for citizenship. Legal scholarship has documented the
extent to which “identity” in the immigration context has worked to
81
“shape access to citizenship in its fullest meaning.” Scholars of race, in
particular, have worked to identify the ways in which exclusionary
82
legislative and administrative measures, as well as Supreme Court cases
83
targeting Asians, have served to structure race. The particular role of
marriage as a vehicle for carving out a subordinate space for migrants of
Asian descent has been, however, insufficiently explored.
Domestically, antimiscegenation laws banning marriage between
Whites and individuals of Asian descent have received some attention.
Work in this area confirms that like African Americans and Native
Americans, individuals of Asian descent found their intimate choices
constrained by state antimiscegenation laws designed to preserve
whiteness and, to that end, prohibit unions whose offspring might
84
destabilize existing racial categories. A number of western states, in
response to growing concerns about the “yellow peril,” adopted interracial
85
bans reaching the Chinese, but also migrants from other Asian countries.
For example, section 60 of California’s antimiscegenation law, which the
California Supreme Court ultimately struck down as unconstitutional in
86
its 1948 Perez v. Sharp decision, banned unions involving individuals
87
hailing from China, Japan, and the Philippines. Section 60 provided that
“[a]ll marriages of white persons with negroes, Mongolians, members of
88
the Malay race, or mulattoes are illegal and void.”
80. See id. at 13–14.
81. Volpp, supra note 19, at 482.
82. See, e.g., Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
83. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Yellow by Law: The Story of Ozawa v. United States, in Race Law
Stories 175, 175 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last
Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 27 (1998).
84. For a detailed exploration of antimiscegenation law and those it affected, see generally Peggy
Pascoe, What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America (2009)
(examining the lifespan of miscegenation laws in the United States that banned interracial marriage).
85. Id. at 80–85 (discussing antimiscegenation law reaching, inter alia, native Chinese, Japanese,
Filipinos, and Hawaiians in Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, and Wyoming).
86. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). Due to changes in the Los Angeles County Clerk’s office during the 1940s,
Perez is sometimes referred to as Perez v. Moroney or Perez v. Lippold. Perez v. Lippold is the title utilized
in the Pacific Reporter. See Peggy Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of “Race”
in Twentieth-Century America, 83 J. Am. Hist. 44, 61 n.42 (1996).
87. Cal. Civ. Code § 60 (West 1941), invalidated by Sharp, 198 P.2d 17.
88. Id. Similarly, section 69 of the same statute decreed that “no license may be issued authorizing
the marriage of a white person with a Negro, mulatto, Mongolian or member of the Malay race.” Cal.
Civ. Code § 69 (West 1941), invalidated by Sharp, 198 P.2d 17.
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In the area of immigration, relatively few legal scholars have
undertaken an inquiry into marriage’s deployment in advancing an Asian
exclusion agenda. The research that does exist, however, begins to lay
bare the troubling ways in which marriage-related provisions have
specifically helped to deny individuals of Asian descent opportunities for
full citizenship and belonging. For example, Rose Cuison Villazor’s work
examining federal provisions that regulate interracial intimacy identifies
the War Brides Act of 1945 as a significant bar to citizenship for Japanese
89
women. That Act, which offered noncitizen spouses of American G.I.s
serving abroad a fast track to citizenship, did not prevent, in explicit
terms, women from Japan and other countries from marrying American
90
citizens or even from immigrating to the United States. Instead, it
worked to enhance exclusionary efforts by omission, leaving the
longstanding ban on Asian naturalization in place, but lifting quotas and
restrictions on disability and easing administrative requirements on
noncitizen spouses in ways that essentially guaranteed citizenship to
91
spouses from Europe and other regions of the world. The dramatic
increase in immigration that the Act helped effect makes it plain that any
history of Asian immigration would be incomplete without some reference
to this provision. Between 1946 and 1950, approximately 114,000 nonAsian women entered the United States and gained citizenship, but only
92
7049 Asians received such treatment. This information supports the
conclusion that the War Brides Act, insofar as it changed the scope and
face of American immigration, did more than adversely affect a subset of
families consisting of American G.I.s and Japanese noncitizen spouses.
By definition, it also played a critical role in shaping normative notions
of what constitutes good citizenship and ideal race in ways that served to
further degrade, marginalize, and stigmatize Asian Americans within the
polity.
Similarly, Leti Volpp’s research on marital expatriation sheds light
on the citizenship-stripping purposes to which the institution of marriage
93
has been applied in the immigration context. The 1922 Cable Act
adopted a policy of marital expatriation for women that persisted in some
94
form until 1931. In effect, it paired racial exclusionary rules with covertureinspired norms concerning female dependency to exclude women from
89. See Rose Cuison Villazor, The Other Loving: Uncovering the Federal Government’s Racial
Regulation of Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1361, 1406 (2011).
90. Id. at 1404–06.
91. Id. at 1405–06, 1416.
92. Id. at 1416.
93. Volpp, supra note 19, at 405–06.
94. Id. at 407, 409. Volpp criticizes others for erroneously stating that the policy of marriage
expatriation ended in 1922 with the Cable Act. Id. at 408. That provision largely only ended the policy’s
application to white women. Id.
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citizenship by treating the act of marrying a noncitizen man as a
95
renunciation of their legal identity as Americans. Feminist legal
scholars have fruitfully explored the gender effects of such rules on the
96
thousands of white women affected by such laws. But Volpp emphasizes
that expatriation policies also regulated race, falling most heavily on
Asian American women and on women married to Asian men, groups
whose marital expatriation, because of immigration law’s continued
reliance on Asian exclusion policies, was not addressed until years after it
97
had been resolved for other groups.
The story of Ng Fung Sing highlighted by Volpp’s research
powerfully illustrates the scope of the marriage-related impairment on
98
Asian American citizenship effected by the Cable Act of 1922. Sing was
born in Washington but later traveled to China with her Chinese-born
99
parents. While there, she met and then married a Chinese native, a
100
decision that immediately divested her of her American citizenship.
When Sing’s husband unexpectedly died only two years later, she sought
101
to return to the United States, but was not permitted to do so.
Although the Cable Act generally allowed women expatriated through
marriage to reclaim their citizenship status through naturalization, Sing
was prohibited from pursuing that avenue of recourse because she was a
102
member of the “yellow race;” thus, she could never naturalize. In other
words, race- and gender-based regulations intersected to lock her in a
legal double bind from which she could not escape.
The examples provided by the War Brides Act and the marital
expatriation provisions of the Cable Act begin to offer a more complete
account of Asian America’s history with marriage. The consequences of
these provisions help to complete the continuum of how marriage has
been deployed in advancing an overall agenda of racial subordination
against other groups. At one end of the continuum rests the outright
denial of marriage rights, such as that in effect during slavery. At the
opposing end are initiatives that have promoted or imposed marriage,
supposedly in order to “redeem” minorities morally, sexually, and
racially. The measures affecting Native Americans and Puerto Ricans in
the colonization context are illustrative examples. Finally, in between

95. Id. at 431, 433–34; see also Cott, supra note 9, at 1445–64 (discussing marriage expatriation
laws). Ethel Mackenzie unsuccessfully launched a constitutional challenge to the application of marriage
expatriation laws in her case in the Supreme Court. See generally Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
96. See Volpp, supra note 19, at 408.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 407–08.
99. Id. at 407.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 407–08.
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these poles exist provisions that divested or otherwise denied existing
citizenship rights.
In sum, the short group histories set out in this Subpart shed
important light on how deeply constitutive of race and American
103
citizenship that institution has been. They demonstrate that marriage
regulation, even as it afforded groups certain rights, helped to shape
ideas and stereotypes about race and gender, and to situate families and
individuals of color as racially and morally inferior to their white
counterparts. For better or for worse, they make it clear that marriage
has functioned also to deprive African Americans and other groups of
formal and informal citizenship along a number of vectors.
B. Marrying Blacks to Second-Class Citizenship
To the extent that adherents of the marriage as citizenship narrative
acknowledge any of the deficits that marriage regulation has imposed on
African Americans, they have regarded them as confined in their impact.
The below analysis demonstrates that this view badly misapprehends the
scope and impact of marriage as it pertains to African America. Marriage,
over the years, by facilitating the hyper regulation of black families and
the stigmatization of blackness more generally, has helped to perpetuate
racial inequality in concrete ways. In effect, marriage-related laws and
policies have married African America to second-class citizenship.
Structural accounts of persistent racial inequality typically omit
marriage or, more specifically, its regulation, from the list of contributory
factors. Attention most often focuses on other durable inequality
sources. Housing discrimination, school segregation, and discriminatory
lending practices, such as redlining, figure prominently in almost any
104
account of cumulative inequality and disadvantage—and for good reason.
The deleterious impact of such practices on black opportunity, wealth,
and standing within the broader community cannot be overstated. At the
same time, the role of other troubling institutional practices and forms of
racial regulation in creating black inequality cannot be ignored. Marriage
regulation’s systemic, racialized effects on African America over time
must be better delineated and understood. Achieving this requires a
structure and institution-sensitive analysis that, perhaps because of the
positive feelings that marriage’s dual status as a frame for loving
relationships evokes, has yet to be undertaken in full. Elsewhere, I have
advocated the use of race audits and similar evaluative measures as a way

103. See Heath, supra note 16, at 31.
104. See, e.g., Lenhardt, supra note 15, at 1534; see also John O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and
Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. Miami L. Rev. 1067, 1068–73 (1998); John A. Powell,
Structural Racism: Building upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 791, 801–02 (2008).
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of identifying and beginning to interrupt the systems and practices that
105
produce racial inequality. Tools of this sort could also be deployed in
tracing the cumulative disadvantage and deleterious effects that marriage
regulation has had on black citizenship, family autonomy, and opportunity.
Institutional structures scholarship on race and inequality provides a
useful starting point in thinking about what such an inquiry might entail.
This research constructs a history of the present insofar as it concerns
itself with the sources of racial disadvantage and inequality in the
106
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This scholarship rejects the common
inclination to regard such inequality as inevitable or natural, or, more
importantly, the sole result of individualized prejudices, actions, or culture.
Rather, this scholarship concerns itself with law, public institutions, benefit
structures, and policy. It sees law, organizational and administrative
structures as key drivers in the distribution of benefits and, to the extent
that race, and other invidious factors influence social policy, in the
107
production of racial inequality.
Ira Katznelson’s book, When Affirmative Action Was White: An
108
Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America, as I
109
have noted elsewhere, provides a powerful example of the institutional
structure analysis. Examining New Deal initiatives that excluded black
workers from labor protections or that incorporated discriminatory
housing policies, Katznelson documents the ways in which some of the
most celebrated social policies in this nation’s history—such as the G.I.
Bill and the Fair Labor Standards Act—rested on racial norms and
structures that, even as they produced tremendous wealth for Whites,
ensured that Blacks would face nearly insurmountable economic and
110
social obstacles long into the future. For example, Katznelson argues
that the exclusion from New Deal era labor protections of farm workers
and domestics—occupations in which black workers were overrepresented
during the 1940s and 1950s—made it nearly impossible for them to
111
improve their economic and social standing well into the future.
Similarly, Robert Lieberman’s book, Shifting the Color Line: Race
and the American Welfare State, elaborates on the ways in which
institutional structures in the welfare context have worked to disadvantage

105. Lenhardt, supra note 15, at 1527.
106. See Robert C. Lieberman, Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State
12 (1998) (discussing scholarship on institutional structures and racial inequality).
107. Id.
108. Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial
Inequality in Twentieth-Century America 35–52 (2005).
109. See Lenhardt, supra note 15, at 1545–46.
110. Katznelson, supra note 108, at 53–61.
111. Id. at 112–29.
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112

generations of African Americans. Conducting a comparative analysis
of three New Deal era programs created by the Social Security Act,
Lieberman persuasively argues that the differing structures and racial
policy exclusions or inclusions effected by these initiatives can be
113
explained by their institutional infrastructure and objectives. For
example, he attributes both the initial widespread exclusion of Blacks
from benefits under the Aid to Families program—a precursor of the
now defunct Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“ADC”)—and
their later overrepresentation in these welfare programs to an
114
intentionally decentralized ADC structure. Lieberman explains that,
unlike its sister initiative, the Old Age Insurance program, which still
operates today, ADC relied on state and local officials to distribute
115
benefits. This meant that early in the program’s existence, white
officials in the South, where the vast majority of African Americans lived
at the time, discriminated freely and openly against families of color,
116
denying them benefits to which they were entitled. As Blacks migrated
North, Lieberman argues, even though migrants faced a localized
structure less intent on denying benefits outright, they faced exclusionary
labor practices and a system of political patronage that essentially tied
117
them to those benefits in ways that also left them vulnerable.
Significantly, Lieberman attributes the racialized tropes—such as the
black welfare queen—now associated with welfare and the so-called
“black American underclass” to this localized institutional structure,
arguing that the political isolation, as well as the economic and social
disenfranchisement of Blacks it enabled, allows such tropes to persist
118
unchecked even today.
That research powerfully displays the potential that an institutional
structure-informed analysis has for better understanding legal marriage
and its impact on African America over time. In the end, the structure of
modern marriage and the differences between it and, say, the legislative
enactments and administrative entities linked to the implementation of
certain Social Security Act provisions mean that the kind of institutional
analyses that Katznelson and Lieberman conduct may not be perfect
analogues for the inquiry into marriage’s racial effects imagined here.

112. See Lieberman, supra note 106.
113. Id. at 7.
114. Id. at 174–75.
115. See id. at 7–8, 173–74.
116. Id. at 7–9.
117. Id. at 175.
118. Id. at 174–76. On the stereotype of the black welfare queen that has influenced welfare reform
debates, see Ange-Marie Hancock, The Politics of Disgust: The Public Identity of the Welfare
Queen 1–2, 23–27, 57–64 (2004); Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction,
and the Meaning of Liberty 1718, 207 (1977).
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Obviously, some significant similarities exist. States, as recent equal
marriage cases involving mayors and county clerks who have spurred
litigation by denying or granting marriage rights to LGBT couples
underscore, have long delegated authority for implementing matrimonial
law to local officials in ways that parallel delegations made under ADC,
for example, and thus could productively be examined for racialized
119
effects. But, the sheer number of states and varied state systems
regulating access to marriage, as well as the difference between state and
federal provisions delineating the many benefits of marriage, would
make exact application of even the multivariant analyses applied by
Katznelson and Lieberman challenging. Ultimately, state-level inquiries
may initially provide the deepest insight into the full range of racialized
effects that marriage regulation has imposed. For our purposes here,
however, simply conceiving of marriage as an institution that performs
regulatory functions and then understanding the decisions and policy
choices concerning marriage as institutionalized outcomes capable of
generating racial disadvantage provides a useful starting point. Even this
relatively modest reframing opens the door to new insights about African
America’s relationship to marriage.
First, a more institutional lens could help amplify the structural
consequences of marriage regulation whose race effects scholars have
already considerably mined. Take, for example, antimiscegenation law,
120
which first surfaced in this country in 1664. Race and family scholars
have extensively explored the development and role of interracial sex
and marriage bans in both establishing racial categories and in reinforcing
121
gender and race norms. While legal prohibitions on interracial marriage
flourished during slavery, in many ways antimiscegenation regimes reached
122
their full force after slavery’s demise. Even as jurisdictions formally

119. See Sylvia A. Law, Who Gets to Interpret the Constitution?: The Case of Mayors and Marriage
Equality, 3 Stan J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 2–3 (2007).
120. See Jonathan L. Alpert, The Origin of Slavery in the United States—The Maryland Precedent, 14
Am. J. Legal Hist. 189, 195 (1970) (referencing interracial sex bans in colonial jurisdictions as early as
1664); see also Rachel F. Moran, Interracial Intimacy: The Regulation of Race and Romance 19
(2001) (discussing 1661 Maryland and 1662 Virginia bans).
121. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 120; Randall Kennedy, Interracial Intimacies: Sex, Marriage,
Identity, and Adoption (2003) (exploring the history of race in interracial sex in relation to legal institutions
and politics); Kevin R. Johnson & Kristina L. Burrows, Struck by Lightning?: Interracial Intimacy and
Racial Justice, 25 Hum. Rts. Q. 528 (2003) (reviewing Moran, supra note 120); Leti Volpp, American
Mestizo: Filipinos and Antimiscegenation Laws in California, 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 795 (2000) (examining
the prohibition and legal history of marriages between Filipinos and Whites in California).
122. Prior to slavery’s end, twenty-five states, including fifteen in the South, where the vast number
of Blacks were located, had or once had antimiscegenation laws. See Peter Wallenstein, Tell the
Court I Love My Wife: Race, Marriage, and Law—An American History 51–65, fig.7 (2002). By
1913, the year in which the last antimiscegenation law was enacted, thirty of forty-eight states had bans
on interracial marriage. Id. fig.8.
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conferred marriage rights on newly emancipated persons in the late 1800s,
white officials eager to control emancipated Blacks moved to minimize
the citizenship effects of such provisions by sometimes simultaneously
123
enacting or reenacting interracial marriage bans.
As scholarship in this area explains, antimiscegenation statutes
functioned to establish whiteness as the ideal and to inscribe a norm of
family monoraciality that retains force even today, influencing marriage
124
and even dating choices. Because of this research, we have valuable
insight into the extent to which antimiscegenation laws signaled the
inferiority of black individuals in cross-racial unions and had an adverse
125
impact on the standing of black families as a whole. For the most part,
however, what we know about the consequences of antimiscegenation
provisions—setting aside racialized violence and the criminal penalties
that they carried—centers on family law matters such as the dissolution
126
or annulment of relationships and intestacy contests. Evidence of
127
statutory provisions defining eligibility for public school enrollment
and even residency within a city neighborhood by reference to
128
antimiscegenation law, however, suggests that the racialized effects of
123. For example, Georgia legislatures provided for black marriage rights in a statute enacted during
the 1865–66 legislative session, but then followed that proviso with language penalizing the licensure or
solemnization of interracial marriages and making clear their illegality:
Any officer issuing a marriage license to parties, either of whom is of African descent
and the other a white person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined not less than $200
nor more than $500, or confined in the common jail three months, or both.
Any officer, or minister of the Gospel marrying such persons together, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and fined not less than $500 nor more than $1,000, or confined in the common
jail for six months, or both.
Franklin Johnson, The Development of State Legislation Concerning the Free Negro 91 (1919)
(quoting Georgia statutory provisions).
124. See Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Pew Research Center, Marrying Out: One-in-Seven New U.S.
Marriages Is Interracial or Interethnic 11–13 (2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/
755-marrying-out.pdf.
125. See R.A. Lenhardt, Forgotten Lessons on Race, Law, and Marriage: The Story of Perez v. Sharp,
in Race Law Stories 343, 350–54 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008); R.A. Lenhardt,
Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 803, 856–57 (2004).
For additional resources on antimiscegenation law, see generally LOVING V. VIRGINIA in a Post-Racial
World: Rethinking Race, Sex, and Marriage (Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor eds.,
2012); Kennedy, supra note 121; Moran, supra note 120.
126. See R.A. Lenhardt, According to Our Hearts and Location: Toward a Structuralist Approach
to the Study of Interracial Families, 16 J. Gender Race & Just. 741 (2013) (discussing annulment and other
consequences of antimiscegenation laws’ enforcement or impact).
127. See Johnson, supra note 123, at 158–59 (citing North Carolina law providing that “[i]n determining
the right of any child to attend schools of either race, the rule laid down . . . regulating [interracial marriages]
shall be followed”).
128. See City of Richmond v. Deans, 37 F.2d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 1930) (invalidating Richmond,
Virginia municipal ordinance that “prohibit[ed] any person from using as a residence any building on any
street between intersecting streets where the majority of residences on such street are occupied by those
whom said person is forbidden to intermarry” as unconstitutional).
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such provisions may extend well beyond this context. Attention to the
institutional and structural consequences of antimiscegenation law would
require further interrogation of these and possibly other aspects of intimate
regulation affecting black opportunity and wealth across generations.
Second, institutional structure analyses could direct new attention to
aspects of marriage regulation whose adverse impact on African Americans
has, for the most part, been ignored. Within African America especially,
the denial of meaningful reparations to freedmen and women—that is,
the proverbial forty acres and a mule—for the ravages of slavery that
they endured remains an oft cited explanation for the relative economic
disadvantage that still affects Blacks today, even those considered middle
129
or upper-middle class. Calls for reparations for past wrongs more
recently have expanded beyond slavery to reach tragic events such as the
Tulsa race riots or to focus on discriminatory housing and lending
130
practices. For example, Ta-Nehsi Coates’s recent article calling for
black reparations supports the claim that “no statistic better illustrates
the enduring legacy of our country’s shameful history of treating black
people as sub-citizens, sub-Americans, and sub-humans than the wealth
131
gap.” Coates’s article provides a sweeping overview of individual
discriminatory practices, private institutional initiatives, and local, state,
and federal governmental policies that have racially exploited, abused,
132
and discriminated against African Americans. While Coates briefly
addresses the devastation of black families during slavery, his very
persuasive case for reparations, not unlike other arguments made in this
area, makes no mention whatsoever of marriage. From a perspective
trained on the structural consequences of institutional decisionmaking,
however, it very much warrants inclusion on this list of contributors to
black social and economic disadvantage.
The often-brutal regulation of black intimate choice and family
obscured by the liberation narrative outlined in Part I.A rested on policy
objectives that bolstered the economic abandonment of former slaves
133
post-emancipation. The goal of containing black economic dependency
and need drove the actions of Freedmen’s Bureau agents on the ground
in southern communities. Whites feared that freedpeople would become
a “‘huge white elephant,’ dependent upon the state or their former

129. For a discussion of the gap between white and black wealth generally, Thomas M. Shapiro,
The Hidden Cost of Being African American: How Wealth Perpetuates Inequality x-xii (2004);
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Forty Acres and a Gap in Wealth, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2007, at 4.14.
130. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, Atlantic, June 1, 2014, at 54 (discussing, inter
alia, lawsuit seeking reparation for victims of the Tulsa race riots).
131. Id. at 69.
132. Id.
133. See supra Part I.A.
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134

masters for support.” They saw marriage as the best way to ensure that
black households, not the state, internalized the tremendous need of
135
freedpersons. Dependency was a vice that all families—white or
black—were exhorted to avoid. Yet, the fallout of the “war on dependency”
in terms of the enforcement of marital obligations and norms had, as Part
136
I notes, a disparate and often devastating impact on Blacks.
Marriage alone does not explain the federal government’s refusal to
pay adequate compensation to former slaves for the horrors that they
suffered during slavery, or to provide meaningful support for Blacks as
they emerged from bondage. A strong argument exists, however, that
marriage norms touting independence and the internalization of need
may have helped to set the tone and perhaps even the predicate for the
denial of reparations. As with the exclusion of black domestics and farm
workers from labor protections during the New Deal, that institutional
judgment has had ongoing wealth effects for African Americans. So too
137
have other aspects of the postbellum “war on dependency.”
Under state laws, impoverished freedmen already faced imprisonment
for noncompliance with bastardy, illegitimacy, and vagrancy laws designed
138
to ensure performance of marriage and gender-based obligations.
Agents sometimes merely “reminded freedmen of their marital and
139
familial responsibilities,” exhorting them to provide for their families
140
by “industry and economy. . . .” But more often, they sought to compel
black men into labor, even relocating them to distant places where
141
employment was more plentiful, if necessary. In certain circumstances,
they resorted to still more “draconian method[s],” including taking
children from needy families, frequently without parental consent, and
sending them to labor in state-created apprenticeship programs that

134. Franke, supra note 8, at 302.
135. Mary Farmer-Kaiser, “With a Weight of Circumstances Like Millstones About Their Necks”:
Freedwomen, Federal Relief, and the Benevolent Guardianship of the Freedmen’s Bureau, 115 Va. Mag. Hist.
& Biography, 412, 420, 429 (2007); Drew D. Hansen, Note, The American Invention of Child Support:
Dependency and Punishment in Early American Child Support Law, 108 Yale L. J. 1123, 1143 (1999).
136. See supra Part I.
137. Farmer-Kaiser, supra note 135, at 429.
138. See Frankel, supra note 31, at 80–87 (discussing use of vagrancy laws to penalize black men
for noncompliance with marital obligations); see also Stanley, supra note 31, at 113 (discussing
postbellum vagrancy laws and dependency); Hansen, supra note 135, at 1144 (discussing freedmen’s
prosecutions under bastardy and illegitimacy laws). For an excellent discussion of marriage, bastardy,
and apprenticeship laws, see Kaaryn Gustafson, The Legal Manufacture of Hardworking Bastards:
Marriage, Bastardy, Apprenticeship, and the Policing of Race and Labor in North Carolina (Mar. 21,
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
139. Farmer-Kaiser supra note 135, at 416.
140. Id. at 420.
141. Id. at 416.
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replicated labor conditions in force during slavery. The removal of
able-bodied workers from black families only worked to compound the
economic disenfranchisement that marriage facilitated. It also criminalized
Blacks, destroyed the integrity of black families, and promoted a narrative
of black indolence and sloth that still animates public policy across a
143
number of domains.
Finally, analyses sensitive to institutional structure can help trace
how marriage regulation has intersected with other forms of regulation in
ways that racially stigmatize and disadvantage African Americans.
Unlike the government programs studied in the research described at the
beginning of this Subpart, marriage regulation has been transubstantive,
traversing areas as diverse as criminal law, education, public benefits,
144
housing, employment, child welfare, and even voting. For example,
marriage plays a role in the federal welfare programs that Liebermann so
effectively dissects in his work. In ways already discussed, it helped shape
deeply entrenched narratives about black dependency that, as
Liebermann notes, still drive popular responses to welfare and black
145
Americans. Marriage, however, has also figured much more directly
into welfare policy. The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work
Reconciliation Act, which replaced a later version of the ADC program
explored by Liebermann, explicitly incorporated marriage promotion
provisions as a way to minimize welfare reliance and move unmarried
women, including those with children, into the workforce, notwithstanding
146
the absence of meaningful child-care options. Its enactment prompted
race and family law scholars like Angela Onwuachi-Willig to call for
more and deeper “analy[sis] [of] the legal connection between marriage
and welfare as a reversion to an earlier phase of colonialism in the
147
United States.”
A complete institutional analysis of marriage regulation would be
much more capacious than the limited analytical platform that this
Article provides, delving even deeper into the past and launching
142. Id. at 428–29. Not surprisingly, many states, with the support of planters, moved to create such
apprenticeship programs in the wake of the Civil War. See Richard Paul Fuke, Planters, Apprenticeship,
and Forced Labor: The Black Family Under Pressure in Post-Emancipation Maryland, 62 Agric. Hist.
57, 59 (1988). In Maryland, planters apprenticed as many as 3000 children under the state’s relevant
Black Code provision. Id. at 58.
143. Lenhardt, supra note 125, at 851–64.
144. For example, in her work on sexual citizenship, Melinda Chateauvert points to cases of people
“losing jobs and voting rights on the grounds of ‘moral turpitude,’” such as the 1960 matter involving an
African American man named Joe Kirk, who was prohibited from voting in a Louisiana county because
he was accused of “[f]athering a child out of wedlock.” Chateauvert, supra note 18, at 198.
145. See supra text accompanying note 118. For more on the race effects of welfare policy, see
Shani King, The Family Law Canon in a (Post?) Racial Era, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 575, 616–19 (2011).
146. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 7, at 1653.
147. Id.
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additional critical examinations of existing marriage norms and regulatory
frames. As initially indicated, this Part had fairly modest aims. It sought
primarily to signal the potential benefits of applying institutional
structure analyses in the marriage context, and to identify key respects in
which marriage regulation has situated African Americans as “failed
148
citizens” rather than strengthen black belonging.
Thus far, the analysis has focused a great deal on the institutional
effects regulation in this area had on married African Americans
primarily. But in actuality, the structural and stigmatic effects of
marriage have not been so limited. Unmarried Blacks also fall within
149
marriage’s “regulatory shadow.” To the extent that marriage, even with
recent declines, still constitutes the primary normative frame for affective
relationships, it shapes not just the lives of those who formally enter into
150
it, but also the lives of those who do not. Understanding the full impact
of traditional marriage in the area of race, then, requires looking at how
the various institutions and structures that help regulate marriage affect
the unmarried, a category into which most African Americans now fall.
The next Part turns to that issue, exploring factual and more normative
questions about marriage’s place in African America today, and the role
of marriage regulation in perpetuating the economic and social
inequality of black families.

II. The Place of Marriage in Twenty-First-Century
African America
The sobering evidence of the role of legal marriage in racial
subordination and caste set out in Parts I and II strongly suggests that
marriage equality advocates might want to adjust their expectations as
151
the nation awaits the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.
No one doubts that an outcome extending marriage rights to LGBT
couples will be a victory of monumental proportions. And yet, if African
America’s experience teaches us anything, it is that entrance into
marriage, without more, is unlikely to secure immediate belonging for
LGBT America. Chances are that, at best, marriage within the LGBT

148. Brenda Cossman, Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex and
Belonging 122–23 (2007).
149. Dubler, supra note 24, at 1653.
150. Id. at 1656.
151. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom., Obergefell v. Hodges, 83
U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-556); Adam Liptak, A Steady Path to the Justices, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 15, 2014, at A1.
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community, as Katherine Franke has suggested, will be a “mixed
152
blessing.”
The critical question is what the current debate about marriage
rights for LGBT couples mean for African American—for those who are
straight, as well as those who are gay—150 years after Emancipation.
Obviously, marriage did not secure, as so many freedpersons had
153
hoped, full black citizenship after the Civil War. Its acquisition did not
magically ease the destitution of the emancipated; establish the integrity
and inviolability of black families; or guard against the coercion and
154
exploitation so many endured in multiple contexts. But the failure of
marriage to secure full belonging then or even years later begs the
question whether, after decades of experience with its norms and
requirements, we can reasonably expect it to do so now. Instead of trying
to answer that question in a vacuum, this Part turns to the matter of
where marriage currently sits in African America. Part II.A provides
information documenting black marriage decline. Part II.B explores the
legal treatment of so-called “fragile” black families—the poor, unmarried
caregiving units that account for a significant portion of the decrease in
marriage identified. After providing information about the characteristics
and structure of such families, it examines the structural barriers to
economic stability that fragile black families face. Citing recent research
by family law scholars such as Clare Huntington and Maxine Eichner,
this Subpart also argues that while the modern regulation of marriage—
and, by extension, nonmarriage—differs in kind and effect from the
discriminatory and often oppressive regulation discussed in the previous
Part, it often has adverse effects on this population, raising serious
concerns about the wisdom and racial impact of existing institutional
policies and practices in this area.
A. The Decline of Black Marriage
155

Marriage is not what it used to be—in African America or out. In
recent decades, we have seen tremendous flux in the institution once
regarded as so critical to civic governance and the proper functioning of
156
households. In the United States, fewer Americans are married today

152. See Katherine M. Franke, Marriage Is a Mixed Blessing, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2011, at A25
(arguing that securing equal marriage rights carries costs, as well as benefits, for LGBT America).
153. Edwards, supra note 1, at 46–47.
154. See Franke, supra note 8, at 278, 284–85, 293.
155. See generally D’Vera Cohn et al., Pew Research Ctr., New Marriages Down 5% from 2009 to
2010: Barely Half of U.S. Adults Are Married—A Record Low (2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
files/2011/12/Marriage-Decline.pdf. Indeed, marriage is not what it used to be anywhere in the industrialized
world. See id. at 3. Entrance into marriage has declined around the globe. See id.
156. See supra note 12.
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than at any other time in recent memory. The Pew Center on Research
reports that the percentage of married Americans dropped to fifty-two
157
percent in 2010, down from seventy-two percent in 1960. These
statistics reflect higher rates of people never marrying, now at twenty158
seven percent, and the decision among younger adults to delay
159
marriage much longer than their parents or grandparents did. They
also indicate divorce rates that, while lower than they have been in
160
recent decades, dwarf those of the past. Studies suggest “that between
40% and 50% of first marriages, and about 60% of second marriages,
161
end in divorce in the United States.”
Declines of this sort know no color; they can be seen across racial
groups, but they are most dramatic in African America. In 1960, black
162
marriage rates were as high as sixty-one percent. As of 2008, the rate
163
sat at a shockingly low thirty-two percent. On the numbers, black love
and the varying ways it is expressed—whether between adults, in
parenting, or in other caregiving situations—does not currently have a
164
strong link to legal marriage. Indeed, Blacks constitute the most
165
unmarried racial group of any in the country.
166
Consistent with rates nationally, marriage levels among African
167
Americans trend highest among the most highly educated. A division
exists between wealthier, college-educated Blacks and those who are
poor and did not have the opportunity to pursue higher education. Even
so, statistics indicate that “blacks in all educational groupings were less
168
likely to be in intact marriage than were their white peers.” Black
157. Decline of Marriage, supra note 12, at 1.
158. See id. at 12.
159. Id. at 3. Research indicates that, in 2010, only nine percent of individuals between eighteen
and twenty-four years of age and forty-four percent of individuals twenty-five and thirty-four years old were
married. Id. In 1960, forty-five percent and eighty-two percent of individuals in these respective groups
had married. Id.
160. See id. at 16.
161. Alan J. Hawkins, Will Legislation to Encourage Premarital Education Strengthen Marriage and
Reduce Divorce?, 9 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 79, 80 (2007).
162. Decline of Marriage, supra note 12, at 9.
163. Id. Reflecting these social changes, rates of white marriage fell from seventy-four percent in
1960 to fifty-five percent in 2010. Cohn et al., supra note 155, at 8. Hispanic marriage rates declined
during this period as well, moving from seventy-two percent down to forty-eight percent. Id.
164. See Decline of Marriage, supra note 12, at 9–11 (discussing, inter alia, black marriage decline and
increase in black cohabitation and unmarried parenting); see also Inst. for Am. Values & Nat’l Marriage
Project, The State of Our Unions: When Marriage Disappears: The New Middle America 54 (2010),
http://stateofourunions.org/2010/SOOU2010.pdf [hereinafter When Marriage Disappears] (discussing
African American divorce rates).
165. Cohn et al., supra note 155, at 8.
166. Id.
167. See generally June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage Markets: How Inequality Is Remaking
the American Family (2014); see also When Marriage Disappears, supra note 164, at 54–55.
168. When Marriage Disappears, supra note 164, at 54.
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women, for example, “are only half as likely as white women to be
married, and more than three times as likely as white women never to
169
marry.” Likewise, black men are “substantially less likely than white
170
men to be married.” More than forty percent of African America as a
whole has never married, whereas only about twenty-five percent of non171
Hispanic Whites fall into that category.
One sees concomitantly high rates for Blacks along each of the
indicators that might begin to explain a marriage gap of this proportion.
Again, elevated percentages along vectors such as cohabitation and
172
single parenting are not unique to Blacks. Studies show that Americans
as a whole are far more likely to be single, never marrying, or to reside
with intimate partners outside of marriage than they ever were in the
173
past. Still, Blacks post higher numbers relative to other groups. Divorce
174
rates, for example, are higher among Blacks than they are for Whites.
Research indicates that fifty percent of black couples will divorce within
the first ten years of marriage, while less than one-third of white couples
175
will do so.
Decreases in black marriage rates, significantly, have not reduced
rates of black family formation. Black loving relationships continue, just
not within the traditional structure provided by legal marriage. For
176
example, even though not necessarily more approving of cohabitation,
African Americans increasingly reside with intimate partners without
marrying. They are not only more likely than Whites to cohabit with
177
intimate partners, but also are more likely to have and parent children
178
within nonmarital unions.
When the Moynihan Report was released fifty years ago, the rate of
nonmarital births stood at what then was an eye-popping twenty
179
percent. In recent decades, we have seen an exponential increase from
the levels that gave him and others concern. White nonmarital birth
rates, roughly only two percent to three percent in the 1960s, have

169. Banks, supra note 20, at 7.
170. Id. at 246 n.11.
171. Decline of Marriage, supra note 12, at 29.
172. Id. at 10.
173. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Unmarried Couples, Law, and Public Policy 112 (2010).
174. When Marriage Disappears, supra note 164, at 72.
175. See Banks, supra note 20, at 8.
176. Julie A. Phillips & Megan M. Sweeney, Premarital Cohabitation and Marital Disruption Among
White, Black, and Mexican American Women, 67 J. Marriage & Fam. 296, 298 (2005).
177. Bowman, supra note 173, at 112. Significantly, however, Hispanics have experienced the greatest
increase in cohabitating relationships. See Decline of Marriage, supra note 12, at 67.
178. Kristen Harknett & Sara S. McLanahan, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Marriage After the
Birth of a Child, 69 Am. Soc. Rev. 790, 790 (2004).
179. See Gregory Acs et al., The Moynihan Report Revisited 4 (2013), http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/412839-The-Moynihan-Report-Revisited.pdf [hereinafter Moynihan Revisited].
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increased so much that they now approximate the rate for Blacks that
180
Moynihan lamented. Meanwhile, nonmarital births for Blacks have
181
nearly tripled. Nonmarital births now account for more than seventy
182
percent of overall black births in the United States. As with marriage,
studies show that, while no group has been immune from these increases,
an economic divide has emerged even within African America itself. In
1982, African Americans with only a high school diploma had a nonmarital
183
184
birth rate of forty-eight percent. Today, that rate is seventy-five percent.
For black women who lack even a high school diploma, nonmarital birth
185
rates are even higher, at ninety-six percent.
Increases such as these have led, not surprisingly, to equally
significant changes in the structure of black families. Today, “African
American children spend substantially more time in single-parent
186
households than white or Hispanic children.” In fact, they are “much
more likely than [their] white or Hispanic [counterparts both] to live in a
home with only one parent and to have a parent who has never been
187
married.” Further, the parent with whom African American children
188
live is most often their mother, not their father. In 2010, this was the
case for roughly fifty-three percent of black children, up from twenty
189
percent in 1960. In contrast, only twenty percent of white children lived
in such households in 2010, an increase of fourteen percent in the since
190
1960.
Debates about what accounts for the picture of African American
families painted by the statistics just outlined—whether it be structural

180. Id. at 5; see also Robert A. Hummer & Erin R. Hamilton, Race and Ethnicity in Fragile Families,
Future Child., Fall 2010, at 113, 121. Incidentally, nonmarital birth rates also increased for Hispanics
during this period. See Moynihan Revisited, supra note 179, at 3.
181. Moynihan Revisited, supra note 179, at 4.
182. Id.
183. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Triple System of Family Law, 2013 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1185, 1199.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1198 (citing When Marriage Disappears, supra note 164, at 23 fig.5).
186. Harknett & McLanahan, supra note 178, at 790.
187. See Decline of Marriage, supra note 12, at 10. The report explains:
In 2008, roughly half of all black children under the age of 18 (52%) were living in a household
with one parent. A third (32%) were in a household with two married parents. The rest were
living in households with cohabiting partners (6%) or no parent at all (10%). By comparison,
74% of white children younger than age 18 lived in households with two married parents in 2008.
Fewer than one in five (18%) lived in one-parent households, and the remainder lived with
cohabiting partners (5%) or no parent (3%). Hispanic children fall in the middle: In 2008, 59%
lived with two married parents, 27% lived with one parent, 9% lived with a cohabiting couple
and 5% lived without a parent.
Id.
188. See Moynihan Revisited, supra note 179, at 4.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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forces, culture, or some combination of the two—abound within African
191
America and beyond. No one, however, disputes this simple truth:
192
more black families today live outside of marriage than in it. Marriage
just does not provide the primary frame for black loving relationships.
Loving outside of marriage, for better or worse, has become the norm.
The question addressed in the following Subpart is what this means in
practical terms, especially for so-called “fragile” black families, those that
193
have children and are unmarried.
B. Fragile Nonmarital Black Families and the State
In recent years, Sara McLanahan and others associated with the
Princeton and Columbia University-run Fragile Families and Child
Wellbeing Study (“FFCWS”), which examines 5000 children born in U.S.
194
cities between 1998 and 2000 and their families, have generated
important research on the structure, functioning, and challenges faced by
all nonmarital families. While this research combines to paint a broad,
composite picture of nonmarital families and the factors that render
them so fragile in this country, it also provides critical insights into fragile
195
black families, in particular, that bear on this Article’s project.
Nonmarital African American families, this work shows, are among the
most of the fragile.
Unsurprisingly, fragile families of all backgrounds are overwhelmingly
196
likely to be disadvantaged. The women who typically head such
families, whether single, living with a partner, or in a non-cohabiting
relationship, have fewer socioeconomic resources and support than their
197
married peers. As one set of researchers explained, they are, among
other things, “much more likely to have less than a high school education,
have a partner with less than a high school education, and to live in or
198
near poverty than married new mothers in the same group.” Even
within this group, however, fragile black families stand out for the

191. See, e.g., William Julius Wilson, More than Just Race: Being Black and Poor in the Inner
City (2009).
192. Cohn et al., supra note 155, at 2.
193. See Hummer & Hamilton, supra note 180, at 114.
194. About the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, Fragile Fam. & Child Wellbeing Stud.,
http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/about.asp (last visited June 9, 2015).
195. See Huntington, supra note 22, at 97–98.
196. Hummer & Hamilton, supra note 180, at 121.
197. Id. (noting that 37.4 percent of single, white women within fragile families lacked a high school
degree at the birth of their child, compared to only 8.1 percent of married white women, contrasted
with 52.6 percent of single, black women in poverty at the birth of their child, compared with 14.2 percent
of married black women).
198. Id.
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199

particular socioeconomic difficulties that they face. Compared to their
single white peers, as well those in cohabiting relationships, black women
within FFCWS are much more likely to live below or near the federal
poverty line; to have more children; to indicate that they reside in an
200
unsafe or violent neighborhood; and to lack resources such as cars.
They are also substantially more likely than white cohabiting mothers to
201
report having recently received public assistance and, to have a “higher
202
prevalence of [nonmarital] births.” Finally, they are considerably less
likely than their peers to be cohabiting with their romantic partners, even
though they may remain involved with them after the birth of a child, a
203
rate significantly lower than for their white peers. Significantly, black
women in fragile families have comparatively low rates of post-birth
204
marriage: Five years after a nonmarital birth, only nine percent of
205
African American women will have married. These disparities create
consequences that are not limited to the women and men in the cohabiting
relationships. They also create consequences for their children, whose
rates of educational disruption and nonmarital births increase with
206
prolonged exposure to poverty, and arguably for the communities in
which they live.
Socioeconomically, fragile black families sit on a perilous perch that,
even with the overall increase in nonmarital births nationally, increasingly
places them on the margins of American society. Stereotypes about such
families, nurtured in the years since the Moynihan Report’s publication
by conservative pundits and social policies hostile to poor blacks in
particular, suggest that their views about marriage and family also place
them outside the norm. They are presumed, among other things, to place
little or no value on marriage as an institution. Such assumptions, research
shows, has little basis in reality. Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas’s study
of poor, nonmarital families, which included interviews with mothers and

199. Notably, so do Mexican American and immigrant Mexican single and cohabiting women, who
surpass the disadvantage registered by African American women on some measures. See id. at 120, 121 tbl.1.
For example, more Mexican American and Mexican immigrant single and cohabiting women lack a high
school education than do their white and even African American peers. Id. at 121.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 122.
203. See id. at 122 (indicating that African American women are most likely to maintain a noncohabitation relationship with the father of their children).
204. Harknett & McLanahan, supra note 178, at 806.
205. Hummer & Hamilton, supra note 180, at 118. Some researchers attribute low post-birth marriage
rates for black women to an undersupply of African American men. Id. at 125; Harknett & McLanahan,
supra note 178, at 791; see Edin & Kefalas, supra note 21, at 130.
206. See Moynihan Revisited, supra note 179, at 6–7. In 2010, a study indicated that approximately
forty percent of black children resided in poverty. For whites, the percentage of children in poverty
that year, at thirteen percent, was substantially less. Id.
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fathers about their relationships and parenting, revealed that, if anything,
“[t]he poor avoid marriage not because they think too little of it, but
207
because they revere it.” Marriage consistently ranks high in importance
208
among African Americans. Indeed, they are more likely than some to
209
express a desire to marry at some point in the future. At the same time,
210
“uncertainty” and concern about the expectations associated with
211
marriage seem to be significant obstacles to marriage. Much of the
research in this area correlates with the inequality metrics just described.
It seems clear that low-income black heterosexual couples, in particular,
may opt to decouple childrearing from marriage because they believe
that “to do [marriage] . . . right” they must be on a “solid economic
212
footing,” a goal that the structural barriers they face keeps out of
213
reach.
Persistent race-based inequalities obviously “have roots that go
214
beyond differences in the family structures of black and other families.”
The problems discussed in Part III.B, like segregated and low-quality
215
216
housing options; high unemployment rates; disparities in educational

207. Edin & Kefalas, supra note 21, at 207; see Edin & Nelson, supra note 21, at 219.
208. Edin & Kefalas, supra note 21, at 134.
209. See Decline of Marriage, supra note 12, at 9.
210. See Linda M. Burton & M. Belinda Tucker, Romantic Unions in an Era of Uncertainty: A PostMoynihan Perspective on African American Women and Marriage, 621 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc.
Sci. 132, 136–39 (2009) (describing the problem of temporal “uncertainty” and the ways in which such
uncertainty works to discourage marriage as an option for black women).
211. Linda C. McClain, The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility
138–41 (2006).
212. Id. at 140–41.
213. Interestingly, specific concerns about the fulfillment of gender-specific norms and roles also
underlie this general concern about the financial feasibility of the household. For black men, the burden of
having to become the primary economic provider, the position into which postbellum officials sometimes
forcibly inserted them, has been thought to discourage marriage. See Edin & Kefalas, supra note 21,
at 138. For women, in contrast, fear of “financial interdependence” with a partner less economically
established presents a major obstacle. Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 Am.
U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 387, 413–17, 429-30 (2012). One of the young black women Edin interviewed
in her study of poor unmarried women, when asked about the characteristics necessary for a potential
spouse, explained, “He would have to have a job . . . . You have to have a job! You don’t have to take care of
me . . . but you have to have means for something!” Edin & Kefalas, supra note 21, at 114. In other words,
what unfolds is an almost Sisyphean performance of—once imposed, but now thoroughly internalized—race
and gender roles that lie at the center of traditional marriage. Such roles, given the impact of existing racial
disparities, prevent many poor black men and women, from seeing marriage as a viable frame for their
own lives. See Decline of Marriage, supra note 12, at 23 (indicating that eighty-eight percent of black
respondents answered the question whether a man must be able to support a family before getting marriage
in the affirmative, while only sixty-two percent of whites and seventy-seven percent of Hispanics did
so); see also id. (indicating that fifty percent of black respondents answered the question whether a woman
must be able to support a family before getting married in the affirmative, while only twenty-eight percent of
white and forty-seen percent of Hispanic respondents did so).
214. Moynihan Revisited, supra note 179, at 8.
215. Id. at 14–15.
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opportunities and completion rates; and mass incarceration, as
previously noted, affect wide swaths of African America. But these
problems affect fragile black families uniquely, in ways that lock them
219
into ongoing cycles of poverty and marginalization. For poor black
women, socioeconomic circumstances translate into very high levels of
220
“uncertainty” in their intimate relationships and lives more broadly.
Limited resources mean that problems such as housing and food insecurity,
neighborhood violence, unemployment, or even heavy work demands,
221
put a heavy strain on poor, nonmarital parents and children alike.
Research suggests that limited resources may also “block” opportunities
222
for black women to find a potential spouse or financial “breadwinner.”
This type of inequality merely compounds the adverse effects of the
family law structures and policies that directly and indirectly regulate
nonmarital families. The standard account of families in the United
States is, of course, that families are autonomous units that, for the most
223
part, operate freely, without any intervention from the state. In truth,
224
though, “state regulation of family life is deep and broad,” reaching
areas ranging from marriage and child custody matters to welfare and tax
225
benefits that shape family life. The problem for fragile black families is
that such regulation is too often punitive and insufficiently attuned and
226
responsive to the challenges that poverty presents for families. Indeed,
as Clare Huntington argues, existing family law, in focusing so much on
marriage and the rights and obligations that flow from it, often ignores
227
nonmarital families.
The priority given to marriage means that, even today, it still works
to marry black families to second-class citizenship. For example, existing
tax policy incentivizing marriage socioeconomically disadvantages fragile
families by extending benefits to married individuals that are not

216. Id. at 9–10.
217. Id. at 11–13.
218. See id. at 17–18; see also McClain, supra note 211, at 138 (discussing research of William Julius
Wilson attributing “low marriage rates and the rise in female-headed families to a reduced number of
‘marriageable’ black men owing to increased joblessness”).
219. See Moynihan Revisited, supra note 179, at 6–7.
220. See Burton & Tucker, supra note 210, at 135–36 (emphasizing uncertainty as an under-explored
factor in post-Moynihan life for black women and identifying its sources).
221. See Hummer & Hamilton, supra note 180, at 124.
222. See Harknett & McLanahan, supra note 178, at 804, 808.
223. See Eichner, supra note 23, at 26.
224. Huntington, supra note 22, at 58.
225. Id. at 58–59; see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Family Law Reimagined 2, 5–6, 8 (2014).
226. Huntington, supra note 22, at 195–96, 208–20.
227. See generally Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital
Families, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 167 (2015).

Lenhardt_23 (LRH)

1352

6/22/2015 9:46 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1317

228

available to such families. Further, current welfare policy, in addition to
exposing fragile families to government scrutiny and further stigmatizing
229
those who are black, also disadvantages them relative to other families.
Take the example of state-imposed family caps on welfare benefits under
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) program. As
Jill Hasday explains, such caps drastically limit economic support to
families that bear children while receiving benefits. Such caps, present in
almost twenty states, have “‘imposed an extreme financial hardship’” on
230
poor families, especially fragile ones where multi-partner fertility often
occurs, and often results in family dissolution. Parents must elect either
to care for their newly expanded families “without [the] adequate food,
shelter and other necessities” available to families in states without family
231
232
caps, or to dissolve those families in whole or in part. Evasion of the
economic consequences of the family caps is only possible if a parent
removes the child from their home, and places them with extended family
233
or even the foster care system.
Likewise, under changes made by the Personal Responsibility and
234
Work Reconciliation Act, TANF limits the duration of welfare support
and mandates the entrance of poor women into the workforce in ways that
disproportionately affect fragile black families, which are overrepresented
235
among welfare recipients. Child-care costs consume a large proportion
236
of income for such families. While government support exists to cover
some of these expenses, many eligible parents have difficulty securing
237
the funds to procure reliable child care. This compromises the capacity
of single mothers, in particular, to earn support for their families and to
care for their children.
These and other similar policies under existing family law conspire
to compromise the already fragile standing of nonmarital black families
within the state. While the policies just referenced do not affect such
families alone, their disparate racial impact and real effects on black
family integrity are cause for serious concern. Just as it was nearly 150
years ago, when freedmen and women first “stood [for] a brief moment

228. Eichner, supra note 23, at 113.
229. Hasday, supra note 225, at 197.
230. Id. at 214.
231. Id.
232. See id. at 215.
233. Id.
234. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
235. Ariel Kalil & Rebecca M. Ryan, Mothers’ Economic Conditions and Sources of Support in Fragile
Families, Future Child., Fall 2010, at 39, 52–53.
236. Id. at 52.
237. Id. at 53.
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in the sun,” how we treat black families today is critical to ensuring that
238
black citizenship and belonging can be realized.

III. Nonmarriage as Citizenship Enhancing?
The basic assumption that black marriage “is at the foundation of all
239
240
our rights” has never seriously been challenged in African America.
Even in the face of Whites’ aggressive regulation of black marriage,
“[e]arly scholars writing about African American families,” as Melinda
Chateauvert observes in her work, “rarely questioned the Europeanderived nuclear family ideal, holding it as a standard by which to judge
241
racial ‘progress toward civilization . . . .’” W.E.B. Du Bois’s foundational
sociological work chronicling the passage of freedpersons from slavery to
freedom, for example, is frequently disapproving of emancipated persons’
failure to live up to the nineteenth-century marital ideal, lamenting “easy
242
marriage and easy separation” among Blacks.
In The Negro American Family, published in 1909, Du Bois offered
an empirical assessment of affective relationship patterns among black
families throughout the United States. Noting slavery’s devastating impact
on families, he addressed the topic of black immorality, what he termed
243
“the plague spot of Negro relations”:
Without doubt the point where the Negro American is furthest behind
modern civilization is in his sexual mores. This does not mean that he is
more criminal in this respect than his neighbors. . . . It does mean that
he is more primitive, less civilized, in this respect than his surrounding
demand, and that thus his family life is less efficient for its onerous
social duties, his womanhood less protected, his children more poorly
trained. All this, however, is to be expected. This is what slavery
meant, and no amount of kindliness in individual owners could save
the system from its deadly work of disintegrating the ancient Negro
244
home and putting but a poor substitute in its place.

For Du Bois, data indicating that “at least one-half [of Blacks] are
observing the monogamic sex mores” were to be celebrated alongside
growing evidence of educational attainment, “economic independence,”

238. W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America 30 (1983).
239. Edwards, supra note 1, at 47.
240. See Chateauvert, supra note 18, at 201.
241. Id.
242. See Du Bois, supra note 238, at 130. Chateauvert points to texts betraying similar attitudes in her
exploration of black marriage and, inter alia, the failure of African America to see it as civil rights issue in
the 1950s and 1960s. See Chateauvert, supra note 18, at 201. Her intervention helped to give shape to my
independent examination of Du Bois’s foundational work.
243. See, W.E.B. Du Bois, The Negro American Family 130 (1909).
244. Id. at 37.
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and progress toward civilization. He acknowledged that Whites could
occasionally learn from Blacks on matters such as “Negro mother-love
246
and family instinct.” Yet, this pathbreaking scholar and fierce advocate
for civil rights, like others of that time, did not quarrel at all with the
priority placed on marriage or the urgency of black compliance with its
dictates to secure full citizenship.
As a product of the nineteenth century, Du Bois can perhaps be
forgiven for an assessment of freedpersons less charitable than one might
expect, given his stance on other issues. But, of course, the failure of
black leaders and scholars of race to interrogate deeply the assumptions
about race, gender, sex, and citizenship in marriage debates and policy
247
was not corrected by passage into the twentieth or twenty-first centuries.
African America as a whole, given its history and current decline in
marriage rates, has been surprisingly uncritical of marriage regulation.
At no time has marriage been subjected to the critical, normative
examination that residential segregation or the criminal justice system
248
have received for their role in marginalizing black men and women.
249
The intense religiosity of black communities might explain this omission,
or perhaps an enduring sense that, even now, “we are on trial before the
250
tribunal of the nation and of the world.” Whatever the cause, the need
to adjust course could not be clearer. Questions of black marriage,
insofar as they can be linked directly to persistent inequality that also
limits black opportunity in domains such as education, housing, criminal
justice, and employment, speak directly to issues of black belonging and
civil rights.
Traditional marriage has placed an upper bound on our thinking
and imagination with respect to matters of race and citizenship. Just as in
the gender context, where courts and legislators only looked to set the
legal rights of unmarried women by evaluating their position in proximity
to that of married women, current policy measures nonmarital black

245. Id. at 152. Chateauvert notes that celebrating changes in black moral along with “the increase
in the number of college graduates, practicing professionals, home owners, businesses, and charitable
organizations among African Americans” was characteristic of other scholars and thinkers of this era.
Chateauvert, supra note 18, at 201.
246. See Du Bois supra note 243, at 42.
247. See, e.g., Gates, supra note 129 (inviting civil rights advocacy “around responsible sexuality” and
“birth within marriage” among other things).
248. See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness 13 (2010) (arguing that, like slavery and the Jim Crow system, “mass incarceration
operates as a tightly networked system of laws, policies, customs, and institutions that operate collectively
to ensure the subordinate status of a group defined largely by race”).
249. See Neha Sahgal & Greg Smith, A Religious Portrait of African-Americans, Pew Forum (Jan.
30, 2009), www.pewforum.org/2009/01/30/a-religious-portrait-of-african-americans/.
250. Edwards, supra note 1, at 56.
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affective relationships only against the yardstick of traditional marriage.
Even worse, it evaluates potential responses to current conditions in this
light as well. Notably, black feminists offered useful reflections on similar
imitative reforms in the aftermath of the release of the 1965 Moynihan
Reports, inciting a firestorm of debate. They questioned the efficacy of
policies designed to curb the “matriarchal pattern” in black households
252
by bolstering the status of black men as household heads, rather than
by “‘pioneer[ing] egalitarian marriages which can serve as models for
253
young people of both sexes and races.’” Eleanor Holmes Norton put a
fine point on the matter, arguing that “it will be impossible to reconstruct
the black family if its central characters are to be crepe-paper copies
254
acting out the old white family melodrama.” Real change, in other
words, requires flipping old scripts and considering new paradigms.
What is required is a fundamental rethinking and restructuring of
existing law and programs affecting nonmarital families. Unfortunately,
new approaches have been in short supply in current debates about black
families. Forces within and without African America remain deeply
invested in promoting marriage as a key strategy for eliminating black
disadvantage.
Conservatives, capitalizing on a growing national debate about
255
inequality, increasingly tout marriage’s capacity to build wealth for the
256
fragile black families described in the preceding Part. Essentially,
proponents argue—ignoring real questions about the availability and
257
suitability of partners —that for poor nonmarital families in particular,
more is always more, that even two meager paychecks will be better than
258
one. Such arguments, however, vastly overstate the economic benefits
of marriage to African Americans in particular.
Low-income black couples, to begin, might just as well face a
259
marriage penalty as a benefit. For example, the presence of two earners
might actually disqualify a family for the earned income tax benefit,
which takes the income of both spouses into account when determining

251. See Dubler, supra note 24, at 1656.
252. Moynihan Revisited, supra note 179, at 29.
253. Serena Mayeri, Historicizing the “End of Men”: The Politics of Reaction(s), 93 B.U. L. Rev. 729,
736 (2013).
254. Eleanor Holmes Norton, For Sadie and Maude, in Sisterhood Is Powerful: An Anthology
of Writings from the Women’s Liberation Movement 397 (Robin Morgan ed., 1970).
255. See Peter Baker, Obama Taking up Economic Issues on His Authority, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29,
2014, at A1.
256. See, e.g., Kay S. Hymowitz, How Single Motherhood Hurts Kids, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 2014, at SR5.
257. Huntington, supra note 227, at 170.
258. Roberts, supra note 118, at 222–23.
259. Huntington, supra note 227, at 221.
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260

eligibility. Further, the marriage-related benefits for which they could
be eligible, in theory, might not provide adequate assistance. Research
by Dorothy Brown, for example, indicates that black couples benefit less
261
from Social Security survivor benefits than white couples do. The
reality is that the wealth effects of getting married vary dramatically by
262
race, as work by sociologist Thomas Shapiro affirms. In a paper
drawing on data from a twenty-five year study of families, Professor
Shapiro found, that marriage “significantly increase[d] the wealth
263
holdings for white families by $75,635”; but getting married had “no
264
statistically significant impact on African-Americans.” Because “marriage
among African-Americans typically combines two comparatively low-level
wealth portfolios,” it “does not significantly elevate the family’s
265
wealth.”
Even more fundamentally, arguments touting the economic benefits
of marriage rest on an inherently faulty premise. Contrary to what
marriage advocates imply, there is nothing natural or preordained about
traditional marriage and the mechanisms that incentivize entrance into
that institution. Collectively, marriage policy and incentives reflect a set
of very calculated, particular choices and commitments, each with its own
consequences for affected individuals and families. Those commitments,
although long standing, are by no means set in stone; they can be
266
changed.
Demographic realities and the increasingly socioeconomic fragility
of black loving relationships necessitate a greater focus on nonmarital
families—their status, specific needs, and capacities. Rather than setting
traditional marriage as the lodestar for all black affective relationships,
this Article proposes a normative alternative: nonmarriage. Importantly,
this shift in attention does not contemplate the eradication of legal marriage.
For all the ways that it has diminished citizenship, the institution can work,

260. Id.
261. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Social Security and Marriage in Black and White, 65 Ohio St. L. J.
111, 112, 122–43 (2004).
262. See Thomas Shapiro et al., The Roots of the Widening Racial Wealth Gap: Explaining the BlackWhite Economic Divide, Inst. on Assets & Soc. Pol’y 6 (2013), http://iasp.brandeis.edu/pdfs/Author/
shapiro-thomas-m/racialwealthgapbrief.pdf. For more on the racial wealth gap, see generally Shapiro, supra
note 129; Melvin L. Oliver & Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on
Racial Inequality (1997).
263. Shapiro et al., supra note 262, at 6.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 Va. L. Rev. 385, 405, 414 (2008) (critiquing, among other things, the
“reluctance to recognize care networks and nonparental caregivers” and urging the “[l]egal recognition
of networked care [as a way of making] clear that reliance on caregiving networks is not a sign of
pathological dependence or deviance, but rather is an important aspect of providing care”).
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however imperfectly, to enhance citizenship and belonging for some.
Rather, this proposal looks to situate nonmarriage alongside marriage as
a viable frame for organizing black intimate relationships and families. It
acknowledges the extent to which, given current circumstances,
268
nonmarriage constitutes a legitimate, rational choice for many. Thus,
the proposal resists the impulse to strengthen black families by attempting
to drag those who now sit primarily within marriage’s “regulatory
269
shadow” more squarely within that institution’s borders. Instead, this
Article contemplates finding unmarried black couples with children, in
particular, where they are and then looks to build out from there. To the
extent that current rates of nonmarital births and parenting in the United
States generally are unlikely to change in the near term, this shift in focus
could ensure critical support for fragile black families in particular. In the
end, it could work to destigmatize and, in the process, greatly improve
the overall standing of black families in the broader community.
Family law scholars have advanced a range of alternatives to
traditional marriage that together map some of the possibilities for the
270
restructuring contemplated. Some of the proposals contemplate systems
that would operate alongside marriage. Such systems provide adults in
romantic or caregiving relationships access to government benefits.
Cynthia Bowman’s proposal to afford cohabiting relationships “quasi271
marital” status and Linda McClain’s kinship registration system, which
contemplates “governmental recognition and support to forms of intimate,
committed relationships other than marriage,” provide two noteworthy
272
examples. Other proposals more consciously seek to displace legal
marriage as the frame for affective relationships. For example, Laura
Rosenbury advocates legal recognition of adult friendship as a way of
promoting gender equity and undermining the norms enshrined by
273
Martha Fineman’s influential work urges a focus on
marriage.
274
dependency within the structures established by family law. She argues
that the dependent-care relationship, not marriage, should be the basis

267. Lenhardt, supra note 77, at 892–94.
268. See id. at 894.
269. Dubler, supra note 24, at 1656.
270. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 173, at 221.
271. Id. Under this proposal, couples would be free to opt out of this status after either two years of
cohabitation or the birth of a child, as a way of “stabiliz[ing] cohabiting relationships and . . . improve[ing]
the lives of people living in cohabitant households, especially children.” Id.
272. Id. at 193.
273. Rosenbury, supra note 10, at 194–97, 208–11. Under her approach, the government, rather than
providing benefits through domestic relationships, would permit individuals to dispense all the “benefits,
default rules, and obligations attaching to marriage” to one or more of the people “perform[ing] different
functions in their lives.” Id. at 230.
274. See generally Martha Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (2004).
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275

for government support and benefits. Marriage, under Fineman’s
proposal, would be reduced essentially to system of contract, where
adults memorialize their affective or sexual affiliations through written
276
agreement.
This Article does not endeavor to select among these proposals or
others concerning matters of family and law. In cataloguing a subset of
the proposals advanced to date, its purpose is simply to signal that
marriage need not be the only, or even the primary, frame for supporting
black loving relationships. To attempt to do more than that here would
be premature. Thinking about alternative frames for structuring families
creates the conditions necessary to ensure that all families receive the
respect and support that they deserve. But legal scholars of race and
family must do much more to understand and address the unique history
and needs of African American families, particularly those that live
below the poverty line. The racial subordination effected by marriage
regulation, for example, may well require strategies and solutions geared
specifically to race. Without attending purposefully to race in this
context, as in others, real progress may be elusive. As Part II makes
plain, family structures, however widely utilized, are not necessarily race
277
neutral. Questions of race have long informed the positioning and
treatment of intimate choice and affective relationships in African
America.
In generating effective proposals, we must eliminate the marriage
myopia of existing law and policy, and its adverse and stigmatizing
impacts on African Americans. Fortunately, scholars in this area are
beginning to grapple with the fact that nonmarital families are here to
stay. Clare Huntington argues that the law must develop norms and
approaches more likely to support fragile, nonmarital families as they try
to navigate the challenges that poverty can create for them and their
278
279
children. She urges conscious development of “postmarital family law.”
For Huntington, this means adopting “[n]ew legal rules” capable of
disrupting the dynamics and practices that compromise the functioning of
280
nonmarital families. Such rules might “discourage maternal gatekeeping
281
[in noncohabiting families], defuse conflict, and encourage co-parenting.”
More positively, they could also seek to build upon the existing capacities

275. Martha Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth
Century Tragedies 230–33 (1995).
276. Id. at 228–30.
277. See Lenhardt, supra note 14.
278. Huntington, supra note 227, at 172.
279. Id. at 173
280. Id. at 167.
281. Id.
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and positive inclinations of nonmarital families and parents. This might
entail supporting the strategies deployed by parents who have already
developed effective co-parenting techniques or encouraging the
development of “new social norms [that, for example] . . . embrace a
282
broader notion of unmarried fatherhood.”
The idea of capitalizing on the core strengths and capacities of
nonmarital black families will seem, no doubt, counterintuitive to some.
As Parts I and II indicate, public discourse over the years has too often
emphasized the perceived indolence and chronic dependency of African
Americans in general, but especially poor, nonmarital black mothers and
fathers. The welfare queen trope imagines an unmarried black woman
with bad parenting skills who has an irresponsible number of children
283
and is simply unwilling to work. She has no skills and no ambition
284
beyond securing government handouts. The twin stereotype of the
285
unmarried deadbeat dad —which seemed at least partially to animate
even President Barack Obama’s well-intentioned “My Brother’s Keeper”
286
fatherhood program—paints a similar picture of black impotence. This
perpetually unemployed black father avoids paying child support at all
costs and spends almost no time with his children, if he knows them at
287
all. He is the farthest thing away from a “good” father.
Research, however, reveals that, in addition to greatly understating
the effects of the structural inequality in this context, such narratives
ignore how well nonmarital black couples actually manage to navigate
288
the often difficult terrain of parenthood. In truth, not all nonmarital
African American fathers are absent parents. Indeed, as a group, unmarried
black fathers tend to do better than most when it comes to retaining
289
relationships with children with whom they do not reside. “Black
mothers are somewhat more likely to report that the fathers of their
children visited the hospital [after their birth] and want[ed] to be
involved in their children’s lives than are other racial and ethnic
290
groups.” Likewise, studies show that black nonmarital fathers are more
likely than white and Latino fathers actually to maintain a relationship

282. Id.
283. Roberts, supra note 118, at 17–19.
284. Id.
285. Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds, and the Privatization of Dependency, 13
Am. U. J. Gender & Soc. Pol’y & L. 415, 440 (2005).
286. See Kenya Rankin Naasel, It’s a Myth That Black Fathers are Absent, N.Y. Times (Mar. 12, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/03/12/the-assumptions-behind-obamas-initiative/its-a-myththat-black-fathers-are-absent.
287. See Cossman, supra note 285, at 443.
288. See Huntington, supra note 227, at 226.
289. Id.
290. See Hummer & Hamilton, supra note 180, at 122.

Lenhardt_23 (LRH)

1360

6/22/2015 9:46 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1317

291

with a nonresident child; to see their children more often than other
292
fathers; and to maintain a functioning co-parenting relationship with
293
birth mothers over time. That black men and women find ways to
negotiate the difficulties of co-parenting amidst sometimes difficult
interpersonal dynamics, such as those created when one parent enters
into a new romantic relationship, suggests a capacity for parenting,
communication, and conflict resolution that prevailing stories about
294
nonmarital black parents do not capture. This is not to suggest that
nonmarital black families face no challenges. Clearly, they do. But, it also
seems plain that policy initiatives designed to capitalize on co-parenting
strengths and to nurture other capacities could be very productive.
In addition to such initiatives, a focus on nonmarital families could
lead to important reforms in federal and state programs affecting
families, such as expanding the federal Family and Medical Leave Act
and similar state programs to reach a broader scope of workers,
295
broadening the range scope of child-care initiatives. The family-related
proposals outlined in President Obama’s 2015 State of the Union
address—which contemplate extending child care and making access to
Head Start and universal preschool available to the poor—would, for
example, go a long way toward addressing the TANF-related constraints
296
on black parents outlined in Part II.B. Similarly, removing family caps
under TANF would help ensure the integrity of poor black families and
protect them against having to make the choice between nurturing a
child and receiving critical financial benefits. Such violations, as Part I.B
and II.B outlined, harken back to brutal antebellum and postbellum
measures that stigmatized and undermined black families.
Modifications to tax policy concerning the poor could also greatly
improve the functioning and economic status of fragile black families.
Consider the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”), which effectively
enlarges the income available to address family needs. An Urban Institute
report on black families notes that the EITC could be restructured to
297
better support nonmarital black families. For example, the EITC provides

291. Marcia J. Carlson et al., Coparenting and Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement with Young Children
After a Nonmarital Birth, 45 Demography 461, 473 (2008); see Huntington, supra note 227, at 190.
292. Carlson et al., supra note 291, at 190.
293. Huntington, supra note 227, at 190.
294. Edin & Nelson, supra note 21, at 215 (discussing post-break up co-parenting); Huntington, supra
note 227, at 195 (same).
295. See Eichner, supra note 23, at 35–47, 77–90.
296. Michelle Chen, This Unnoticed Part of Obama’s Childcare Initiative Is a Big Deal, Nation (Feb.
4, 2015, 12:41 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/197105/unnoticed-part-obamas-childcare-initiativebig-deal#.
297. See Moynihan Revisited, supra note 179, at 21.
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relatively little support to nonresident parents. Because this is the case,
“unmarried men who have no children or are living apart from their
children and can only secure low-wage work may find working in the
299
mainstream not worth the effort.” “Increasing the EITC for nonmarital
parents who reside separately from their children could have the effect of
300
encouraging more work among single men” who can find it. Better
work opportunities could help such men become “established in the
mainstream economy and be better positioned to support their [current
301
or] future families financially.” For nonmarital African American
fathers, such policy changes might even have the added benefit of
improving affective relationships with children and even former partners.
These and other possibilities for more effectively supporting
families—and ensuring that nonmarital households are not required to
shoulder dependency in ways that, under current policy, marital
household do not—could be transformative for all families, but especially
fragile black caregiving units. Pairing such initiatives with structural
interventions designed to resolve problems such as housing segregation,
inequities in the criminal justice system, and antidiscrimination policies
concerning the workplace and the classroom could dramatically reduce
302
the economic insecurity of fragile black families and children.
More broadly, developing nonmarital alternatives for family support
would have the benefit of reframing notions of race-based, gender-based,
and family-based citizenship overall. So long as marriage continues to be
the metric against which all black loving relationships, married or
unmarried, are evaluated, African Americans, at least given current
statistics, will continue to fall short. For centuries, marriage has troubled
the relationship of Blacks to the state, rendering them subordinate and
stigmatized, outcasts within its borders. Introducing an alternative
normative frame for loving relationships, of which all groups could take
advantage, would begin to change that calculus. It reduces marriage’s
303
“regulatory shadow.” In effect, it would change how African America
is situated within the polity without coercing its members into changing
how they form or experience their loving relationships—a courtesy that
freedpersons were not afforded as they took their first steps toward
freedom. In other words, a focus on nonmarriage might actually provide
a measure of belonging to black couples and their families. It would

298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See supra note 106 (noting that greater economic stability might even serve to increase marriage
rates among Blacks who cite financial instability as an important reason for foregoing marriage).
303. Dubler, supra note 24, at 1656.
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make them “becoming,” rather than “unbecoming” citizens. A growing
number of nonmarital relationships, no doubt at least in part because
they are non-black and possess economic resources, now enjoy such
305
acceptance without the taint of pathology. Nonmarriage could do the
same for African America.

Conclusion: Nonmarital Loving and the Struggle
for Black Civil Rights
This Article has advanced two basic claims: first, that marriage has
very often been citizenship diminishing, not enhancing, for Blacks; and,
second, that nonmarriage might do more than marriage ever did to
secure black civil rights and belonging. In doing so, it has, in effect,
sounded a national “call to action” concerning black families, albeit one
very different than the one issued by former Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan five decades ago. While acknowledging the structural barriers
faced by African American families, Moynihan ultimately looked to
neutralize the threat that persistent racial inequality poses for black
citizenship by requiring that poor Blacks, once again, internalize their
need within marital families. He voiced public call, but ultimately settled
on a solution—given the norms underlying traditional marriage—still
very private in nature.
This Article aims to inspire a new discourse about race and family.
It looks to take black familial relationships “public” in a way that they
have not yet been. Obviously, such relationships have often been a
matter of public concern in the United States. But our public discourse
and solutions have too often emphasized the individual, private choices
of African Americans instead of the racialized systems and structures
that both inform and constrain such choices. In essence, the obsession
with traditional marriage as the key to African America’s salvation has
masked the true effects of racial inequalities on black families, as well as
obscured marriage’s role in creating such inequalities.
The more complete history of black marriage offered, and the focus
on nonmarriage as a viable frame for black affective relationships urged
in this Article, constitute important, but still preliminary steps in
changing this dynamic. Earlier, I offered institutional structural analyses
as one way to begin to detail the concrete effects of marriage’s role in
advancing racial subordination and caste, identifying potential areas of
concentration. There is still much more to learn about the ways in which
law and policy have structured race and family in this country, however.
Legal scholars and others concerned about black belonging can do more

304. See Cossman, supra note 148, at 122.
305. See, e.g., Ellin, supra note 13.
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to excavate the history and effects of institutions and structures that bear
on black families. As I argue in Part I, there is good reason to see family
structures and systems relating to housing, public education, or
employment as intimately intertwined.
We can also do more to explore how African America itself has
understood and experienced family and kinship ties within such systems.
306
The research on fragile families provides one useful starting point.
Legal scholars are already examining how well family law, broadly
defined, affects and supports such families. Analyses that deal much more
explicitly with issues of race in this context could open even more fruitful
avenues of inquiry. In Part II.B, this Article demonstrates that welfarerelated policies have an especially punitive effect on fragile black
families. Additional targeted research along these and similar lines could
yield other important insights, including those relating to how we
perceive and pathologize black dependency and poverty. Likewise, thinking
very broadly about kinship structures and the norms that inform them, as
I have done in other work, constitutes another potentially productive
area of research.
Finally, as Part III suggests, work in this area must examine
alternatives to traditional mechanisms for supporting families that
directly engage matters of race. Such alternatives, along with other
improvements in law and policy, could benefit a range of families.
Nevertheless, ignoring the unique issues confronting families of color
risks exacerbating some of the very problems scholars in this area look to
address. Even more, failing to attend to race in this context might
minimize the benefits of some of the alternative measures proposed. For
example, the proposal that the law start to recognize and build upon the
capacities of nonmarital black parents could eventually lead to important
shifts in the gender norms that inform how such parents interact with one
another and their children. Opening additional avenues for black fathers
to serve as family caregivers could benefit black children, as well as black
working mothers and other kinship-based caregivers.
In sum, the time to determine how laws regulating affective
relationships actually bear on black civil rights and belonging is long
overdue. The confluence of three events pertaining to family and
citizenship—the 150th anniversary of the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the fiftieth anniversary of the release of the controversial
Moynihan Report, and the Supreme Court’s widely anticipated decision
concerning the extension of marriage rights to LGBT couples—suggests

306. Melinda Chateauvert’s observation that black civil rights organizations studiously avoided
matters of family and sexual relations in developing civil rights advocacy plans could provide another
important window into issues in this area. See Chateauvert, supra note 18, at 200.
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that the time is ideal to take this inquiry up in earnest. Legal scholars and
others concerned about matters of race and family should capitalize on
the opportunity to do just that.

